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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the effectiveness of the mixed-use development (MXD) as a
catalyst to generate economic and cultural diversity in central Tokyo. With the
understanding of the differences and similarities between Japanese and U.S. cities, I explore
two U.S. mixed-use developments aimed to revitalize the downtown center: Horton Plaza
in San Diego, completed in 1985 and Renaissance Center in Detroit, completed in 1977. The
purpose of this study is to draw factors that contributed to the success of MXDs and to
apply such lessons to MXDs in central Tokyo, which is dominated by office buildings and
lacks economic and cultural diversity.
Three important lessons are learned from the U.S. experience. The first relates to
public sector commitment. Public funding and a spirit of entrepreneurship on the part of
developers are essential for the success of an MXD. The second lesson relates to overall
project design. The architectural design plays a critical role in attracting a diverse group of
people and generating business and cultural connections with the communities in the
surrounding area. The final lesson is the importance of development expertise as
demonstrated by Ernest Hahn, former Chairman of the Hahn company, whose vision,
expertise and political savvy made Horton Plaza a success.
Land prices of Tokyo is a major barrier in applying these lessons. It is not easy to gain
development sites large enough for MXDs to be a catalyst to attract diverse people and
activities. In addition, high land prices may induce MXDs in central Tokyo to be dense and
enclosed to cover the site cost. Such physical appearance is not appropriate for MXD as a
catalyst because it may undermine the interactions between MXD and the surrounding
communities. Public sector contribution is a key to eliminate these constraints. The power
of eminent domain helps provide development sites by assembling fragmented pieces of
land. Public funding may "dilute" land prices and gives flexibility in MXD's project design.
In order for the public sector to contribute to MXDs in central Tokyo, people of Tokyo need
to be aware of the seriousness of the problem of the city center of Tokyo and to agree to
invest public fund to generate economic and cultural diversity in central Tokyo
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, Tokyo has grown to become one of the world's economic leaders.
However, for the people living in Tokyo, this economic growth has brought many problems.
The more important Tokyo becomes, the more serious and complicated its problems become.
This thesis focuses on problems of the city center of Tokyo and presents possible solutions.
1.1 Identifying the Problem
Tokyo has the world's highest land prices, which have changed the pattern of land use
in Tokyo drastically. High land prices especially affected the city center,1 because residents,
hoping to avoid expensive housing and property taxes, have been moving to the suburbs.
The decrease of the population in the city center of Tokyo began in the 1960s, when land
prices began appreciating significantly with the strong growth of the economy. The
population of the city center of Tokyo was approximately 550,000 in 1960. Between 1960
and 1970, the city center experienced a 15% population decrease. The population of
Tokyo's city center in 1990 was approximately 265,000, which is about half of what it was
in 1960.
As the population dwindled, small retail stores and other services lost their customers.
Property taxes and rents became burdens also for retailers. Decreasing revenue and
increasing fixed costs squeezed their profits and eventually shut them down. Office and
specialty retail shops such as luxury apparel stores and expensive boutiques are the only
survivors in the city center. As a result, central Tokyo has lost its diversity and vitality.
1 The city center of Tokyo consists of Chiyoda, Chuo, and Minato wards. The total area of these
three wards is 16.5 square miles, or 42.1 square kilometers.
Figure 1-1 Tokyo Metropolis
Tokyo Metropolis consists of two major sections: the Ward area and the Tama
area. The Ward area consists of 23 wards, including 3 central wards. The Tama
Area consists of 27 cities and 14 towns and villages. Its total area is 710 square
miles
Chiyoda ward
Minato ward
City Center of Tokyo
Area Square Miles
Central 3 wards 16.5
Ward area 240.7
Tama area 453.1
Cities that lack diversity are no longer vital cities. Lack of diversity in a city is a
fateful problem in the long run. It can serve to deteriorate the fundamental base of the city:
its rich variety of people and their activities. Without a diverse and thriving populous,
cities just are "places" for specific activities and institutions such as office buildings, sports
stadiums, banks, universities, and airports. Although people work and function in these
places, the former sense of the city as a cultural base and community no longer exists.
1.2 Mixed-Use Development
Governments have tried several possible ways to regain economic and social diversity
for the center of Tokyo. However, these policies have not been very effective and mediocre.
The housing linkage program is a typical one. The housing linkage program implemented by
the central three wards, consisting of Tokyo's city center, is supposed to attract a nighttime
population. This programs requires private real estate developers to build a certain number
of housing units, at their own expense, with offices. Unfortunately, the program became
inactive as Tokyo real estate market crashed in 1991, and office construction declined.
Launching "catalyst projects" is the latest idea to revitalize the city center. The
mixed-use development (MXD) holds the most potential to attract diverse group of people
and activities. MXDs are real estate development project that have three or more different
uses, such as office, retail, and residential, all of which are physically and functionally
integrated. MXDs are oriented to a diverse group of people instead of to a specific group of
people because of variety of uses. MXDs can transform a deserted city center into a lively
place where many people gather to work, play, and live by creating what cities were
originally like: places where people lived and worked.
In this thesis, I will focus on the MXD as a catalyst to attract diverse groups of people
and activities to the center of Tokyo again. Major questions that this thesis asks are: How
does an MXD create conditions and a potential to attract a diverse group of people to the
center of Tokyo? What steps are required to transform the city center of Tokyo successfully
into a thriving place to live and work?
1.3 Learning From U.S. Experience
Since Tokyo is not alone in its problem with a vacant city center, we can learn from
other countries' experiences. The experiences of some U.S. cities are extremely useful in
considering the revitalization of Tokyo by the MXD. Although the center of Tokyo has not
built a large scale MXD yet, in many U.S. cities, MXDs have proven to be an effective way
to rebuild diversity in cities and attract people to the downtown to live, work, and shop.
Many U.S. cities are suffering from devastated city centers. Many large U.S. cities are
declining in terms of population and industry. The decline of the city, especially a city's
downtown district, has caused several side effects: decay, poverty, and crime. These
problems have worsened the situation. The downtowns of many large U.S. cities continue
to spiral downhill with neglect, crime, drugs, and poverty.
Land prices are not the basic cause of the problem in the U.S. Following World War II,
and with the increase use of motor vehicles, Americans moved to residential neighborhoods
in the suburbs. Interstate highways also promoted the move by shortening time distance
between the city and the suburbs. Only the poor and working classes remained in the city's
center. In the 1950s, The U.S. Government tried to revitalize declining city cores by
implementing federal policies under the Urban Renewal Program. For various reasons, this
program weakened city centers rather than revitalized. Then, Urban Renewal projects
destroyed traditional neighborhoods consisting mainly of non-white people living in the city
center.
After government policies failed to revitalize the downtown, city officials had to
revitalize their downtown by themselves and focused on the potential of MXDs.
U.S. experiences have highlighted the effectiveness of MXDs in attracting a diverse
group of people to the city center. In the U.S. MXDs were originally used to create a large
scale, lively, commercial space in relatively immature sections of large cities. Rockefeller
Center in New York City is deemed the original MXD. This development has various tools
that attract diverse people to the area, which was not very good area for real estate
development when it was developed in the 1940s. It has an ice skating rink in the sunken
garden, national network TV studios, and many shops, including a major department store.
The biggest advantage of MXDs is that its different uses attract diverse people who generate
a lively atmosphere. Hence, if successful, MXDs can serve to revitalize city centers in the
same context in cities around the world. However, as we shall see, the MXD is not a
panacea. While some U.S. cities have revitalized their downtown through MXDs, other
have been less successful. If Tokyo is to succeed, it must learn from both positive and
negative experiences of U.S. cities.
1.4 Methodology
In drawing viable lessons from U.S. experiences, I study two MXDs planned as
revitalization projects in the states of California and Michigan. One is Horton Plaza,
completed in 1985, in San Diego, California, and the other is Renaissance Center, completed
in 1977, in Detroit, Michigan. Due to time constraints, I will study just two cases. To draw
better lessons from this relatively small number of cases, I designed the research
methodology as follows:
(1) General Information from Literature Review
I will examine general information on the origins and the development of MXDs in the
U.S with a literature review. Why was it created? How has it evolved to respond to
requirements? What has been the accomplishment of MXDs with respect to revitalizing
devastated downtowns in the U.S?
This chapter frames the settings for the study of each development case described in
the following chapters. MXDs are supposed to serve as catalysts to generate positive
changes in downtown. Launching such "catalyst projects" has been a common practice
across the U.S. since the 1960s However, not all the MXDs succeeded. MXDs can revitalize
devastated downtowns only if they satisfy certain conditions. I will try to identify such
conditions by studying two MXD projects.
(2) Conditions for Success: Horton Plaza, San Diego
Horton Plaza, located in downtown San Diego, consists of a 891,000-square-foot
retail space, a 452-room Doubletree Suite Hotel, a 65-unit residential complex2, 14-screen
cinema, and a 770-seat theater. This project is recognized as one of the most successful
revitalization projects in the U.S. The financial performance of Horton Plaza has been
exceptionally good and downtown San Diego has experienced extensive positive changes
since its development. By examining Horton Plaza, I will identify several conditions for the
success of downtown redevelopment projects.
(3) What Went Wrong: Renaissance Center, Detroit
Renaissance Center, located in downtown Detroit, is an office-oriented MXD, with a
2.2 million-square-foot office complex, 220,000 square-foot retail, and the 1,453-room
Westin Hotel. The project failed to service its debt payment and was taken over by five
mortgage lenders in 1983. As Renaissance Center suffered from financial disaster,
2 The Doubletree Hotel and residential complex were developed by a different developer than that
of Horton Plaza shopping center.
downtown detroit did from further deterioration. Renaissance Center has inspired lost of
arguments, which suggest what are necessary for MXDs planned as revitalization projects.
(4) Comparison: Horton Plaza and Renaissance Center
The comparison between Horton Plaza and Renaissance Center will make
observations examined in the preceding section clearer. Comparison will be conducted with
the following three respects:
* Motivation and origin
e Players
e Project design and performance
(5) Applicability of Lessons
After drawing lessons from U.S. experiences for downtown revitalization projects, I
will examine the applicability of them to MXDs in central Tokyo.
In Chapter 2, 1 will examine urban decline in Tokyo and U.S. cities in order to make my
cases clear: MXDs play an important role in the revitalization of U.S. Cities and lessons
from the U.S. in ways to revitalize city centers are useful for Tokyo. Chapter 3 explores
general information on MXDs. Chapters 4 and 5 will explore the development process and
outcome of two MXDs described above. I will contrast the two MXDs to pinpoint and
examine important conditions that make the MXDs a success in Chapter 6, and examine to
what extent lessons from the U.S. cities are applicable to Tokyo in Chapter 7. Chapter 8
will conclude how the lessons from the U.S. are relevant to the revitalization of the city
center of Tokyo.
CHAPTER 2
HOW HAVE THE PROBLEM EVOLVED?
Since World War II, cities in Japan and the U.S. have dramatically changed; they have
grown and evolved and have experienced suburban flight. Tokyo and many U.S. cities have
common urban problems. They are concerned with the deterioration of the city center.
While the population in metropolitan areas has increased steadily, due to the flight of the
population from the city center to the suburbs, the city center has become a magnet for office
buildings, poverty-stricken slums. Due to this, city centers lack diverse people and cultural
activities. This chapter details what has caused this problem in the U.S. and Tokyo.
In the following sections, I will provide a general overview on what has happened in
cities in Japan and U.S. and, then, take a closer look at the three cities this thesis focuses on:
Tokyo, San Diego, and Detroit. Deterioration in the centers of these cities can be explained
partly by the nationwide socioeconomic transformation, and partly by specific economic
and political conditions. In exploring urban revitalization projects in San Diego and Detroit,
and applying lessons gained from these cases to Tokyo, it is extremely useful to understand
that how the city center of these three cities evolved.
2.1 Changes in Japanese and U.S. Cities After World War II
Japan was so damaged by the war that economic rehabilitation was given first
priority. To achieve economic growth, Japanese cities were utilized as places for
production, not for people. As a result, living environments of large metropolitan areas
have deteriorated with industry, pollution, and industrial infrastructure. In addition, the
appreciation of land prices in large cities has made residential costs spiral, so that only the
wealthy can afford luxury condominiums or to rent in up-scale urban areas.
By contrast, the U.S. was by far the biggest industrialized country in the world when
World War II ended, and many people in the U.S. moved to the suburbs seeking more
comfortable life styles due in part to the automobile. After World War II, more and more
families were able to afford a car which enable them to move to the suburbs, away from
urban crowding, crime, and pollution. The Interstate Highway system promoted the move.
This suburbanization in the U.S. with the declining tax rate helped cause the deterioration of
cities.
2.1.1 Rapid Economic Growth of Japan
Japan achieved unusual economic growth between 1950 and 1970. Japan's Gross
Domestic Products (GDP) increased approximately five times in this period, a 9.1% average
annual growth (real terms).1 During this period, Japan transformed itself into an
industrialized country (Figure 2-1). In 1950, approximately 26% of GDP was produced by
Figure 2-1
GDP Breakdown by Industries
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Source: National Economy Calculation, Economic Planning Agency
1 National Economy Calculation, Economic Planning Agency.
agriculture, fishing, and lumber businesses. This percentage decreased to 7% in 1970 as
industrial output had, instead, increased by 13 percentage points to 45%. The service sector
also had expanded its output from 43% to 48% of the total GDP (Figure 2-1).
This rapid economic growth promoted drastic urbanization. In 1950, only 37% of
Japan's total population (83 million) lived in the urban areas. This proportion jumped up to
56% in 1955, and to 72% by 1970. This drastic movement was characterized as the
structural change in the labor force, which occurred between 1955 and 1965. As Japan
transformed into an industrial country, young people who could not find a job in their rural
hometowns moved into the city. As shown in Figure 2-2, in 1955, 41% of Japan's labor force
was engaged in agriculture, fishing or the lumber business. This proportion decreased to
25% in 1965. As the labor force declined in the agriculture, fishing and lumber industries,
the service industry grew to the biggest labor group in Japan in 1965, which accounted 44%
of the total labor force.
Figure 2-2
Source: National Census, National Bureau of Statistics
As a result of the Japan's rapid economic and industrial growth, the residential
environment of large Japanese cities gradually deteriorated. People became aware of the
worsening living conditions when the rapid economic growth began to slacken off in the
middle of the 1970s. One of the major problems was pollution. Major factories in large
metropolitan areas and automobiles became major sources of air, water, and coastal
pollution. Many people living in urban areas who had enjoyed economic and cultural
advantages, began feeling uncomfortable about living in urban areas. The streets were
crowded, the air was dirty, parks and open space declined as industry grew.
In addition to various kinds of pollution, land prices in urban areas appreciated
drastically while Japan's economy was growing rapidly. Land prices are determined by a
number of factors, but economic growth and an increase in population are probably the two
biggest factors. Some people argue that Japan's rapid economic growth depended heavily
on the value of land to create a credit system to make the necessary capital available. Land
was almost the only tangible asset that could guarantee capital when Japan lost everything
due to the war. The role of land in financing capital has never been more important than
after World War II, even after Japan became an economic giant.
As shown in Figure 2-3, land prices in urban areas had been continuously appreciating
parallel to the Gross Domestic Products (GDP) up until 1985. The indices (1955 = 1) of
land prices in urban area and the GDP were 56 and 38, respectively, in 1985. The
Consumer Price Index (CPI) remained low compared with land prices or the GDP. This
means that the relative price for land in 1985 was more expensive than in 1955.
These two problems, deteriorating urban living standards and increasing land prices,
became major obstacles for people living in urban areas. In this context, Japan had
achieved economic growth in exchange for the deterioration of cities. The cities grew but
became costly places to live.
Figure 2-3
Urban Land Price, GDP, and CPI
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Source: Urban Land Price Index, Japan Real Estate Research Institute; National Annual Economy
Report, Economic Planning Agency; Annual CPI Report, Bureau of Statistics
2.1.2 Suburbanization in the U.S.
The U.S. saw a large-scale movement to the suburbs following World War II and
throughout the 1950s to the 1970s: people, firms, and retail stores moved to the suburbs.
From 1950 to 1974, population in the U.S. increased by 56.6 million, of which 39.5 million
(70%) represented growth in suburban rings, 7.9 million in the central cities, and 9.2 million
by rural areas.2
The suburbanization of the U.S. was a technological, cultural and political
phenomenon. From the Victorian streetcars to automobiles, the technological development
of transportation modes freed people from the city where most employment opportunities
2 Thomas M Stanback Jr. And Richard Night, Suburbanization and the City (Montclair:
Allanhead, Osmun, 1976), p. 3.
were offered. U.S. suburbanization after World War II was substantially promoted by the
automobile. Between 1950 and 1980, when the American population increased by 50 %, the
number of their automobiles increased by 200%.
However, this rapid growth in auto ownership is not a sufficient explanation for the
initial development of the suburban trend. If that were the case, every city in world that
enjoys the development of transportation modes would show a similar residential pattern.
Suburbanization was stimulated not only by the increased use of autos, but also by changes
in lifestyles. The increase in home ownership contributed to the movement as well. For
those who wanted to buy home, the open space and uncrowded settings of the suburbs was
more fascinating than what was offered in the city. In addition, people were able to buy
larger houses in the suburbs because of lower land prices than in the city.
In terms of the percentage of people who owned homes in the cities was between 40
and 50 percent during the first four decades of the twentieth century. The percentage of
home owners in 1950 was 55 percent. This proportion climbed to 66 percent by 1970.3
Housing starts, by 1949, returned to just above the pre-depression years of 1 million, never
to drop below that figure in the following forty years.4
While the federal government did not realize the far reaching effects of
suburbanization, it strongly promoted the suburbanization by its policies. The federal
government sponsored two major policies: the construction of the urban highway by
Interstate Highway Act and promotion of home ownership through governmental financial
institutions. This is why I would call the suburbanization a political phenomenon.
(1) The Interstate Highway Act
The Interstate Highway Act, which received congressional approval in 1956, called
3 National Census, U.S. Bureau of Census (1900-1980).
4 U.S. Department of Commerce
for 41,000 miles of interstate highways, of which 6,100 miles would be in urban areas. The
act required that the federal government pay 90% of the costs of construction. The
Interstate Highway Act was sponsored by President Eisenhower, who gave four reasons for
building the costly road system: current highways were unsafe; cars too often became
snarled in traffic jams; poor roads saddled businesses with high costs for transportation;
and modern highways were needed because "in case of atomic attack on our key cities, the
road net must permit quick evacuation of target areas."5
Although President Eisenhower did not mention anything about cities and suburbs
with respect to the Interstate Highway program, the interstate system promoted
suburbanization substantially by shortening the traveling time between the suburbs and the
city. Moreover, the system hastened the downward spiral of public transportation, which
also further promoted urban sprawl.
(2) Promotion of home ownership
The U.S. federal government has historically encouraged people to own houses by
establishing governmental financial institutions such as Federal Housing Administration
(FHA, 1934), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae, 1938), and the
Veterans Administration (VA, 1946). These institutions' main role was to insure long-term
mortgage loans made by private lenders for home construction and sale. Their role has
never been to lend money or build houses. Instead, they induce lenders who have money to
invest it in residential mortgages by insuring them.
For home buyers, tax deductible mortgage interest payments and real estate taxes
were strong motivation to own houses. In addition, the newly constructed interstate
highways allowed them to buy relatively less expensive, and more spacious, suburban
5 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 249.
housing.
As a result of suburbanization, many cities in the U.S. started losing their population
and vitality. Since relatively wealthy people tended to move to suburbs, the city centers
were dominated by working class and low-income people. After the wealthies left the cities,
they began to deteriorate. With the decline of urban areas, people living in the suburbs
started to avoid coming to the city. The suburbs had everything, including restaurants,
department stores, and, theaters. People in the suburbs created self-sustainable
environments.
2.2 Tokyo, San Diego, and Detroit
Tokyo has been faced with two opposite population dynamics: declining population
in the city center and growing population in the outer ring. Since Tokyo has been by far the
most concentrated region, balancing Tokyo and other areas was a major concern for the
government. The national government launched a series of National Comprehensive Plans
which tried to slow the development in Tokyo's Greater Metropolitan Region6 and to
promote development in other metropolitan regions in Japan. Despite these efforts, the
concentration in the Greater Metropolitan Region could not be slowed. As a result of the
concentration and rising land costs, among other problems, the population in the city center
has been decreasing since the 1960s.
The situation in the U.S. was somewhat simpler than that in Japan. The U.S.
government and many city leaders were concerned with the flight to the suburbs because
people were vanishing from the city. To lure people back to the city center, the federal
government implemented a few important federal policies aimed at slowing the suburban
flight. While, from a macro perspective, the pattern of suburbanization in large U.S.
metropolitan areas was surprisingly identical, individual cities demonstrated their unique
patterns of suburbanization and reactions to problems caused by it.
2.2.1 Urban Decline in Tokyo
The transformation of Tokyo after World War II was really the reflection of major
structural changes of Japan. Japan had to recover from extensive damages from World War
II. To speed the rehabilitation, the national government issued a policy to centralize
6 Tokyo Metropolis and surrounded three prefectures, Chiba, Saitama, and Kanagawa, consist of
the Greater Metropolitan Region.
everything in Tokyo. Important resources such as capital, governmental authority, and
information were placed in Tokyo, under the plan to control growth and balanced
development. The plan called Tokyo War Damage Rehabilitation Plan, signed in 1945,
stated:
"Although Tokyo should become an industrial city in the future, the priority for the
present should be on development as a political, economic, and cultural center; when
the time comes, its political and cultural functions shall be moved to other areas."7
Despite the plan's original intention, Tokyo is still, by far, the biggest political, economic,
and cultural center of Japan with a population of over 11 million.
(1) Land Prices Appreciation
After Japan's economic growth slowed down in the 1970s, spiraling land prices
became one of the most important issues for home buyers and corporations, so some
restrictions for trading land were implemented. The Japanese government launched the
National Comprehensive Development Plan in 1977, and suggested the relocation of the
national capital to mitigate the congestion and high land prices from which Tokyo was
suffering.
However, between 1985 and 1990, land prices in Tokyo sharply appreciated and
finally became a serious social problem. At the peak of the real estate boom, the so called
"bubble era," land costs and other goods and services reached all time highs in Tokyo. For
example, in 1991, the highest land price in Tokyo, and in Japan, was $330,000 dollars per
sq. ft.; the highest rent for office space was $211 per sq. ft. annually; the average price for
7 Tokyo Metropolitan Government, A Hundred Years of Tokyo City Planning (Tokyo Metropolitan
Government, 1994), p. 47.
condominiums sold in Tokyo was $825,000, and for detached houses, $583,000.8 Few
could afford these prices.
With land prices spiraling and complaints from people about the high cost of living
in Tokyo, public officials began to take note of the problem and devise solutions. The first
target of the criticism was the real estate developers, especially those providing housing.
After the developer, people, through the media, began criticizing financial institutions who
lent money to developers. Finally criticism reached the national government, the Bank of
Japan, Japan's Central Bank, and the Ministry of Finance. These institutions were accused
of poor implementation of government policy. The public's focus was only on land prices.
They were not aware of the city center problem.
The national government and Tokyo politicians reacted to the criticism with plans to
decentralize housing and firms in order to lower land prices. They tried to achieve this by
creating satellite cities with strong business cores. At the national level, the government
designated several cities, located approximately 30 miles away from the city center of
Tokyo, as "Business Core Cities." The Tokyo Metropolitan Government also designated
seven "City Subcenters" in Tokyo that surround the original city center, which were
supposed to absorb the strong demand for office spaces which continue to boost land prices
in the city center. These policies did not consider the problems that suburban flight created
for the city center of Tokyo.
The most extreme measure in politicians' efforts to decentralize is the plan to
relocate the capital. This has become an important political agenda. A government
committee formed to examine the possible relocation of the capital recommended that the
capital of Japan be relocated approximately 180 miles away from Tokyo. There are several
candidate sites for the new capital. The problem with this plan is that it focuses on
8 Mitsui Fudosan, Annual Real Estate Statisitcs (Mitsui Fudosan, 1995), p. 98, 108.
lowering land prices by easing congestion, and does not address the problem with the
declining city center of Tokyo though it could have adverse effect to the problem.
(2) Shrinking City Center
During the overheated real estate boom after the late 1980s, many traditional
neighborhoods in the city center of Tokyo were replaced with rows of high rise office
buildings. The market was so strong that banks and life insurance companies were eager to
finance land acquisitions. Therefore, real estate developers could gain as much capital as
they needed to buy land. Investments were made mainly in office developments. First, they
invested in prime or traditional office locations, and then, they extended their reach to
residential areas in the city center.9 As a result, the city center of Tokyo, which was a
relatively low-density mixed-use area, was transformed into a daytime city occupied by
Japan's elite and wealthy class.
The decreases in population of the city center of Tokyo paralleled the continuous
influx of people out to the Greater Metropolitan Region (Figure 2-4).
The population of the Greater Metropolitan Region had increased from 15 million, in 1955,
to 32 million in 1990: it more than doubled in 35 years. It accounted for 17% of Japan's
total population in 1955, and 26% in 1990. In the same period, the population of central
three wards had decreased by 52% to 265,000. The rate of decrease between 1985 and
1990 was 18.2%, which was the biggest in a five-year term since 1955. This decrease was
caused mainly by the sharp appreciation of land prices in Tokyo.
9 The zoning area called "Hybrid Residential Area" allows both residential and commercial uses.
Most residential areas in the city center of Tokyo were zoned "Hybrid Residential Area."
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(3) Housing Linkage Program
Municipalities in the city center of Tokyo, Chiyoda, Minato, and Chuo Wards, have
been deeply concerned with the decrease in population. Since the decrease in residents was
caused by the increase of commercial development such as office buildings and high-end
retail stores, these municipalities are not seriously concerned with the deterioration of the
tax base. Rather, the decrease in the population means a decrease in the importance of the
municipal administration. If people living in these areas continue to move out, various
public services will be unnecessary. In fact, many public schools were forced to shut down
because of insufficient student and housing.
Each ward and city has regional representatives, elected by its constituents, for the
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Tokyo Metropolitan Council. The lower the number of residents is, the fewer the number of
the municipal representatives the city and ward get. Therefore, not only city officials, but
also municipal politicians are eager to slow the decrease of residential flight to the suburbs
Influenced by growth-control regulations implemented in many U.S. metropolitan
regions such as Boston and San Francisco, the central three wards (Figure 1-1), Chiyoda,
Chuo, and Minato, initiated a housing linkage program at the end of the 1980s to promote
housing development. Each program requires office building developers to provide a
certain number of middle to high-income housing units' in their office developments.
From the municipal government's point of view, this program is a good method to
increase the population because it does not cost the government at all. From the real estate
developer's point of view, the housing provision requirement is somewhat an unreasonable
added cost imposed suddenly because land prices in Tokyo are too high to provide
marketable housing units. Private developers must provide apartments that financially
make no sense. They are supposed to offset the loss from the required housing units with
profits generated by office space.
While the housing linkage program is a fairly new regulatory tool, some critics have
pointed out some of its problems:
a. Legality 1
The linkage program can be viewed as an extension from of two other methods
of land use control: exactions for infrastructure and other public services, and
inclusionary zoning. However, its legality is not stable, and can be challenged
on the ground of taking mainly because of the lack of a rationale nexus between
office developments and housing provision.
10 Hosing linkage programs enacted in U.S. cities are mainly for low- moderate- income housing.
11 Rachelle Alterman, Evaluating Linkage, and Beyond (Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy, 1988), p. 27.
b. Sensitivity to Market Effects
The linkage policy in general, and in specific is sensitive to changes in the
development market. Because the linkage program targets large scale
commercial real estate development, the performance of the program totally
depends on the real estate market.
c. Politics of the Linkage Program12
The housing linkage program has been enacted by elected officials in response
to certain economic and political conditions. Therefore, it is fairly vulnerable to
the changes in the conditions which may reduce the effectiveness of the
program.
This program has served to increase the housing supply in the center of Tokyo,
however, the second problem, the fact that it is tied to fluctuation in the real estate market,
cited above has weakened the program. With the crash of Tokyo real estate market in the
early 1990s, the program dwindled because office demand in Tokyo decreased
dramatically. Many projects were suspended or abandoned. When developers stopped
building offices, the program lost its power.
2.2.2 San Diego and City Beautiful
After losing its race to attract population and commerce in the 1930s, San Diego never
developed a principal industry except for military-related industry and tourism. The city
was perceived as a resort for the well-to-do. By the end of 1950, 188,000 people had jobs
there, 14,000 of which were employed in the aviation industry, with a production level of
$105 million a year. The Navy and Marine bases added 14,000 more persons bringing
income of $117 million. The number of tourist visiting San Diego in 1950 rose to 660,000
and spending approximately $60 million.
12 Paul P. Poston, Context and Strategy for Local Housing Initiatives: The Boston Linkage Program
Master's Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Real Estate, 1991.
In terms of suburbanization promoted by automobiles and new roads in the U.S., San
Diego was not an exception in the 1950s. The State of California approved a three billion
dollar, 10-year highway improvement program in the 1950s. The city center began decaying
as people moved to the suburbs. Major department stores followed the move. The city of
San Diego proposed to provide large-scale parking structures to induce downtown shopping
and to encourage department stores to stay downtown. Citizens of San Diego rejected the
proposal in 1950 by a margin better than two to one. In the same year, Sears, Roebuck and
Company announced it was moving its operations from downtown to a 12-acre site in the
suburbs.13
While shrinking in downtown, the population in the suburbs was growing rapidly in
the 1950s and 1960s. By 1965, San Diego was the sixteenth largest city in the U.S. with a
population approaching 640,000 (National Census, U.S. Bureau of Census). As population
increased, the city extended its boundaries. Its residents were younger than 10-year
previous, in average age. The population of retired people was also declining. Newer
residents represented families with children. The average age of the population in 1960 was
about 27 years compared to 33 in 1930.14
Because San Diego did not have major industries that depended on a low-cost labor
force, the minority population in San Diego was not a significant factor. Mexican-
Americans in 1960 constituted approximately 6% of the total population; as did blacks.
San Diego was under the influence of the civic booster campaign of "City Beautiful,"
which was launched as a result of the World's Columbian Exposition of 1883 in Chicago
before the downtown deteriorated. This campaign was presented as a movement to
beautify the city, and it demonstrated that public buildings could have an ever greater
13 Richard F. Pourade, The History of San Diego: City of the Dream (La Jolla: Copley Books, 1977),
p. 94.
14 Pourade, p. 214.
impact when collected into a coherent district and designed to function as an ensemble.
According to the "City Beautiful," the City tried to centralize its public buildings and
used the Urban Renewal Program to achieve this objective. Inspecting some urban renewal
projects under way in San Francisco, and Sacramento, San Diego prepared a plan for the
new Civic Center, dedicated in 1964. The Convention Hall, Exhibit Hall, and parking
garage were opened for business; the City Administration Building and the 3,000-seat Civic
Theater were added several months later.
The break up of the city through suburban sprawl and the decentralization brought by
the automobile and shopping centers left downtown sections of San Diego with only a
limited commercial and financial base.
2.2.3 Detroit and Urban Renewal Program
(1) Interstate Highway
Like in San Diego, suburbanization in Detroit started with the highway, which began in
1950 when the first portion of the north-south highway was opened. When the Interstate
System was initiated in 1956, the city's freeway network was expanded. By 1974, almost
200 miles of freeways in the Detroit metropolitan area were complete with approximately
65 miles under construction or scheduled for construction. This gave Detroit one of the most
extensive freeway networks in the country. 15
As the freeways provided easy access to plentiful land to the east, west, and north,
Detroit's population began to move outward. The city's lack of natural boundaries or
nearby cities promoted this movement and Detroit residents discarded inner city property
15 Arthur Woodward, Detroit: American Urban Renaissance (Tulsa: Continental Heritage, 1979), p.
144.
as if it were a 3-year-old car. White ethnic groups tended to move out along the nearest
radial. Blacks also gained mobility and access to more desirable neighborhoods.
In 1950, the city's population was at an all-time high of 1,850,000. The population of
the suburban area was 1,160,000. By 1960, the city's population had decreased to
1,670,000 while the suburban population had almost doubled to 2,100,000. In 1970, these
figures stood at 1,500,000 and 2,700,000 respectively. By 1975, 1,340,00 resided in Detroit,
while more than 3,195,000 lived in the suburbs.16
The move to the suburbs was almost exclusively a move by Detroit's white population,
resulting in a dramatic shift in the city's racial composition. Over the past two decades,
from 7,000 to 9,000 Detroit households have changed from white to black each year. In
1950, more than 300,000 blacks were living in Detroit, about 16 percent of the city's
population; in 1975, the number was estimated to be in the neighborhood of 750,000, more
than 56 percent of the total population.
(2) Urban Renewal Program
The Urban Renewal Program was also a major factor characterizing the pattern of
suburbanization in U.S. cities. This federal program was a part of the Housing Act of 1949,
which was implemented to rebuild cities left by wealthy people who moved to the suburbs.
Although this program originally did not intend to clear up slums, city officials, mayors, and
business leaders were desperate to make use of the program to clear up "obsolete" parts of
their cities.
Making a powerful strategic alliance, federal and city government officials, and
business leaders began rebuilding cities in accordance with their sense of value. Instead of
16 National Census.
narrow and congested roads, they wanted to have interstate highways in the city. Instead
of traditional neighborhoods in mixed-use areas, they wanted to have clear-cut land use
consisting of high-rise buildings occupied by the elite.
As a result, the urban renewal project created enough open space for urban interstate
highways by sweeping away a number of people who were on the planned routes. Bernard
Freiden says, "...the urban renewal program was truly prime for taking of land with
administrative and legal reviewers easy choices of renewal areas and with Congress waiving
residential requirements."17
In Detroit, unlike in San Diego, the city initiated a massive urban renewal project
because Detroit was concerned with the urban decline more deeply than San Diego. In other
words, the problem with Detroit was more serious than that of San Diego. The poorest
residential neighborhood were targeted to "renewal." The areas selected comprised some of
the most vital and colorful of Detroit's ethnic and working class communities. Urban
renewal projects in these areas cleared more than 1,500 acres of land which contained more
than 17,000 housing units and 2,000 businesses. An estimated 7,660 families and 6,730
single individuals had to be relocated. 18
These people faced a serious housing problem. Most of the people who were forced to
relocate were blacks, and they were not sufficiently compensated for the relocation. In
addition, not many low-income houses were provided. In Detroit, urban renewal projects
built 758 low-income houses, and demolished 8,000 low-income houses.19 In addition to
various other racial injustices, this housing problem made them frustrated, angry, and
disenfranchised. Many lost their community and a sense of community.
This problem was a major reason behind the 1967 riot. The linkage between urban
17 Bernard Frieden and Lynn Sagalyn, Downtown Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), p. 25.
18 Woodford, pp. 148-149.
19 Frieden and Sagalyn, p. 52.
renewal projects and racial problems was clear and it caused similar problems in other
areas in the U.S. New Haven, Connecticut and Newark, New Jersy were also model cities
for the Urban Renewal Program. Much federal funding was spent in these cities and both
had serious riots. These two cities, also had higher proportion of minorities at the time and
continue to have high percentages today.
'As in these three cities, urban renewal projects across the U.S. failed to rebuild cities
due the following reasons:
a. Lack of sympathy to the people living in the city
Through 1967, urban renewal projects forced more than 400,000 families to
move and the federal urban highway forced 330,000 to move. People had great
difficulties finding new homes because these programs did not compensate
people adequately for moving them out and to find decent homes. Many
families had to wait to reside in low-rent public housing. The waiting list is so
long. Some middle-income people sought housing in the suburbs, but
low-income people could not afford housing in the suburbs. Many people
became urban refugees, who, later, created other problems in the cities, due to
lack of support networks, jobs, and services.
b. Awkward products created by the program
Concrete, and high-rise apartment buildings that replaced houses did not
fascinate people; in fact, they were poor places to live with little or no green
space, overcrowding, cheap construction, and poor services. These structures
were later criticized as "obsolete." Jane Jacobs, an outstanding critic of these
projects, emphasizes the importance of the city neighborhood, which consists
of the city as its molecule, and claims, "...Americans are poor at handling city
neighborhoods, as can be seen by the long accumulation of failures in great grey
belts on the other hand, and by the turfs of rebuilt city on the other hand."20
In 1974, after much criticisms, urban renewal programs were discontinued. Faced by
serious problems with urban refugees, poverty, riots, crime, and severe criticism, the federal
government replaced project-based aid with the community development block grant, under
which cities were awarded a certain amount of funds for downtown projects.
20 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961), p.112 .
2.3 Conclusion
Every nation's economic prosperity is somehow linked to urban development and well
being. Radical transformations after World War II in Japanese and U.S. cities have been
generally explained by economic conditions and government policies stemming from
economic conditions.
Japan achieved exceptional economic growth after the war at the expense of the
residential environment and quality of life of its cities. Cities were utilized as places for
production, not as residences for people. When economic growth slowed down in the
1970s, people began to be aware of serious strains caused by rapid economic growth:
pollution and exorbitant land prices. The national government could manage to reduce, to a
certain degree, pollution by a series of regulations, but it could not control land prices at all.
On the contrary, the deterioration of cities in the U.S. was caused by its postwar
affluence. The U.S. was the world's sole economic giant when World War II ended. People
in the U.S. were affluent enough to buy home and to seek more comfortable lifestyles in the
suburbs. The federal government could afford to promote the movement by making more
capital available to potential home buyers via federal housing mortgage programs. Cities
were left to low- moderate-income people. This general pattern of habitation in the U.S.
represents the dual structure of its economy. In other words, the residential pattern in the
U.S. represents the income gap between rich and poor people, which is closely related to the
racial issue.
Although a nation's economy is a major determinant in shaping its cities, special
conditions of specific cities, including history, major industry, racial components, and
geographical location, influence development and decline.
Tokyo is an extreme case of the side effects of rapid economic growth. Tokyo, as
Japan's largest economic and cultural center, has been most negatively affected by rapid
economic growth. Living in Tokyo is prohibitively costly for residents and for corporations
as well. Housing prices and commercial real estate rents in Tokyo are the world's highest.
The decrease in population in the city center of Tokyo and surrounding regions is not
surprising at all. The sharp appreciation of land between 1985 and 1990 made land prices
a major social issue, but, to date, no effective solutions have yet been implemented.
San Diego and Detroit, which like most U.S. cities experienced massive
suburbanization following World War II, exhibit different types of transformations. Detroit
experienced a more serious urban deterioration and a greater decrease in population in the
1960s than did San Diego. This is mainly because of the industry and racial components.
Detroit had more industry and a larger African American population, and experienced more
economic tensions.
Detroit has been a major industrial city, and it grew rapidly along with the U.S
economy. The automobile based industries is Detroit's most important industry. Rise of
the U.S. economy was largely achieved by the auto industry. On the other hand, San Diego
did not have a major industry except for military related ones. The populations of San
Diego and Detroit in 1950 were 560,000 and 1,850,000, respectively. San Diego was much
smaller city than Detroit.
As a big industrial city, Detroit had much more serious racial and ethnic differences.
Many minorities, mostly African American people, came from the south to Detroit seeking
relatively well-paid jobs. Managers and executives of large corporations were, in many
cases, whites. As a result Detroit became unstable because of formal and informal conflicts
between races. This hastened the process of suburbanization in Detroit compared to San
Diego. The typical white flight in Detroit left the downtown severely deteriorated.
Detroit depended much more on the two federal aids, the Interstate Highway and
Urban Renewal, than did San Diego because the deterioration of its downtown was much
more serious than in San Diego. However, this made the situation worse. On the other
hand, the perspective of San Diego was "City Beautiful." The city tried to make itself more
attractive in physical terms. This shows us that the degree of the problem in the city center
was less serious than in Detroit.
CHAPTER 3
MIXED-USE DEVELOPMENT: A CATALYST TO REVITALIZE DOWNTOWN
After the deterioration of many downtown centers and the failed federal Urban
Renewal projects, U.S. cities began revitalizing their city centers at their own accounts and
implementing their own ideas instead of counting on the federal government. Launching
mixed-use developments (MXD) in downtown districts has proven to be one of the more
effective ways to revitalize deteriorated downtowns. In this chapter, before I explore two
MXDs in the following sections, I will discuss what an MXD is, and how this type of
commercial development has contributed to revitalization of deteriorated downtowns in the
U.S.
MXDs were originally implemented by private developers in the 1940s as purely
commercial developments. After city officials who struggled to revitalize downtowns found
this type of development applicable for their efforts, MXD began to be planned and
implemented by public and private partnerships.
3.1 Concept
The concept of the MXD is relatively new, and the concept continue to evolve as
MXDs develop and expand. In the 1970s, the Urban Land Institute (ULI) defined the
concept of the MXD. The ULI characterized the MXD by the following three criteria:1
1 The Urban Land Institute, Mixed-Use Development Handbook (Washington D.C.: ULI, 1987), pp.
3-5.
3.1.1 Three or More Significant Revenue-Producing Uses
MXDs have three or more significant revenue-producing uses that support each
other. There are many real estate developments that have more than one use, but the lack of
the scale and functional diversity differentiates them from today's MXD. For example,
commercial buildings or apartments with small shops in lower levels of the buildings are not
MXDs. The three or more uses offered by MXDs should be significant and produce decent
revenue. In most mixed-use projects, revenue-producing uses include retail, office,
residential, and/or hotel/motel facilities. Other revenue-producing uses include
wholesaling in the merchandise mart (Peachtree Center, Atlanta), industrial space (Crown
Center, Kansas City) and National Theatre (National Place, Washington, D.C.).
3.1.2 Physical and Functional Integration
The second characteristic of mixed-use developments is a significant physical and
functional integration of project components and, thus, an intensive use of land. All project
components are interconnected by pedestrian ways, although this integration can take many
physical forms:2
e a vertical mixing of project components into a single tower megastructure
* careful positioning of key project components around centrally located focal points
e interconnection of project components through an elaborate pedestrian circulation
network
e extensive use of escalators, elevators, moving sidewalks, and other mechanical
means of facilitating pedestrians' horizontal and vertical movement.
2 Mixed-Use Development Handbook p. 5.
Pedestrian orientation is a deliberate outcome of the planning process. MXDs
usually have a gross FAR3 of 3.0 or more in central cities. This second criterion distinguishes
mixed-use developments from other real estate projects that may include three or more
significant revenue-producing uses but do not integrate them.
3.1.3 Coherent Plan
Finally, MXDs are usually developed from a coherent development strategy and
plan. Master planning for an MXD, compared to a single-purpose project, demands a much
greater diversity of specialized participation from economists, designers, and property
managers. The planning process is therefore more complete than for most other real estate
projects.
Whatever their form, "coherent" plans for MXDs typically set forth the types and
scale of land uses, permitted densities, and general areas on the site where different kinds of
development can occur. MXDs offer a highly organized center in downtown. MXDs that
are supported by substantial public funds may be required to have architectural reviews
and to specify
respective responsibilities and financial obligations.
These requirements, in the case of some projects, govern projects as to the scale,
timing, type, and density of buildings and relationships among project components, open
space, and infrastructure at the site. This approach distinguishes such projects from
unplanned mixing of uses which often result from the separate, unrelated actions of several
different developers.
As I mentioned, MXDs still continue to evolve today, and the three characteristics
3 Floor Area Ratio (FAR) is gross building area divided by net land area.
described above are flexible. There will always be room for interpretations as to whether a
project is or is not a mixed-use development. Whatever their exact character, MXDs present
distinct opportunities and cities and the development community alike, and while they have
been both hailed and criticized, they are clearly one of the most provocative concepts to
emerge in downtown revitalization plans and real estate developments in the twentieth
century.
3.2 What MXD Have Tried to Achieve
MXDs have been effective for the revitalization of deteriorated downtowns mainly
because it potentially can create an environment that attracts diverse people to downtown.
When downtowns across the U.S. lost their social and economic diversity, they began to
decline economically and socially. The basic objective in revitalizing the downtown
economy is to attract more people, more frequently, and hold them for as long as possible
by creating a variety of reasons to come downtown. In the following section, I will discuss,
how MXDs tried to do this.
3.2.1 Revitalizing Downtown as a Marketplace
One of the important objectives of MXDs, as a tool to revitalize downtowns, is to
make downtown an attractive marketplace. As discussed in the preceding chapters,
changes in transportation modes, economics, an demographics have had dramatic impacts
on downtowns competitiveness as marketplaces. Upper- and middle-class households no
longer seek housing in downtown. Travel distance, traffic congestion, and the difficulty of
parking in the intensively developed downtown area has weakened the central city's
attractiveness as a retail location. The Interstate highway system has cut the tie between
manufacturing and its traditional downtown location because downtowns no longer offer
economic advantage in terms of access to suppliers, markets, and employees.
To attract people, downtowns must be an attractive marketplace again. MXDs
have tried to increase the value of downtown as a marketplace where people come to work,
shop, play, and live.
(1) Diversity
MXDs offers several significant revenue-producing functions to make a downtown
district as an attractive marketplace by adding economic diversity. The essence of
downtown is diversity, with a range of choice in things to do and see, drawing people
throughout the day and evening. To be an economically healthy, self-sustaining
marketplace, downtown must include offices, housing, and entertainment functions in
addition to retail shops and restaurants.
MXDs provide a variety of functions in a relatively compact area. This compactness
enhances the linkage between facilities and activities and generates synergy between uses.
Moreover, the compactness of an MXD makes it possible to concentrate uses in order to
create a critical mass of activity rather than spreading activity thinly over a broader area.
Successful MXDs can create a ripple effect to generate diversity within downtowns.
Only one MXD cannot change a downtown entirely. In this context, MXDs themselves are
not a mighty card, rather they are a good tool to be used carefully. The success of an MXD
depends on how well they are planned and implemented.
(2) Anti-Euclid Zoning
An MXD is a challenge to the conventional U.S. zoning system. Since 1920s, the U.S.
zoning system has been based on the notion of Euclid zoning. The Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.4 upheld the constitutionality of
comprehensive zoning. By this decision, comprehensive land use restrictions by zoning
ordinances were established and any ambiguity or mixture of land use was eliminated.
MXDs challenge the Euclid Zoning by creating a mixed-use spot in downtown.
4 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
The inflexible restriction of uses through zoning ordinances has weakened downtown
activities. When downtowns held a critical mass of people, comprehensive land use
restriction worked well because downtowns retained diversity as its whole area. However,
once downtowns lost their population after World War II, this type of zoning adversely
affected downtown. Strict regulation of uses prohibited free activities and transformed
downtowns into limited purpose place. Therefore, creating a mixed-use area is actually a
natural solution to recreate diversity in downtowns.
3.2.2 Redesigning Downtown Physical Character
The deterioration of downtowns as marketplaces also caused a deterioration of a
physical structure of downtown district. There are two major factors that adversely affect
a downtown's physical character: high-density development and parking facilities.
The elevator, and the high-rise building created vast possibilities to tremendously
increase a city's development density. With the car replacing foot-power as the principal
mode of transportation to and within downtown, an increased concentration of people
necessarily meant increased roadway capacities and increased space for vehicle storage.
Unless public transit could be provided to bring people downtown from outlying residential
areas without their cars, the cohesive development pattern of the traditional
To provide the parking needed to support high-rise, high-density buildings, overall
building coverage was thinned out and density was concentrated vertically rather than
horizontally. Downtown land occupied by marginal development (obsolete commercial and
industrial buildings and low-income residential areas) became more valuable as convenient,
inexpensive surface parking to serve new high-rise developments. Older buildings no longer
returning a profit were cleared, erasing part of the city's heritage and reducing downtown's
visual continuity and identity as a special place.
(1) Pedestrian Circulation
High-rise buildings surrounded by parking weakened traditional downtown devel-
opment patterns by interrupting the continuity of the spatial enclosure formed by buildings
framing the street. These gaps in the development fabric also created inactive, unsafe, and
unattractive pockets in the street environment, further reducing the quality of the pedestrian
experience.
Because more buildings were separated by surface parking lots in downtowns, the
convenience for pedestrians working and living in the city decreased and the continuity of
street-level activity linking major activities was lost. As the pedestrian environment became
less attractive and distances between destinations increased, walking became less
appealing. As a result, street-level pedestrian activity declined and the potential to develop
and maintain the retail uses that depend on pedestrian traffic was reduced.
MXDs try to offer pedestrian circulation in downtown. While vehicular access and
parking to serve visitors of an MXD should be convenient and efficient, a clear emphasis on
pedestrian use must be established in the projects. People walk around between each
functions of an MXD, and also walk between an MXD and its surrounding area by
enhancing street-level activities within the project.
The ability to generate interaction between the surrounding area is one of the most
important criteria for the evaluation of MXDs. Since automobiles provide the principal
access to MXD, the potential for interaction between an MXD and the surrounding area
tends to be hampered. Some people compare MXDs to the "fortresses" which people on the
outside never know what is inside. Especially in the 1970s, many MXD were enclosed and
internally focused.
Some internal orientation is common for successful mixed-use developments,
partially as a result of the use of atria and enclosed malls, but several MXDs went to the
extreme to internalize spaces. Such MXD clearly failed to enhance street-level activities and
to offer a pedestrian circulation.
(2) Identity
Providing a positive identity to downtown is also what MXDs have tried to do. To
become more marketable as a development location, downtowns must have a positive
identity and be a pleasant setting for people. Most MXDs are planned to create a new
identity for downtowns and to provide distinctive physical appearances. In addition to its
large scale, the architectural value of MXDs perk up a downtown and provide a sense that
the downtown no longer a deteriorating place.
These characteristics of MXDs sometimes adversely affect their financial conditions.
MXDs that have significant symbolic impacts often require vast amount of capital because
physical significance is often exhibited by scale. Large scale, architecturally significant
projects may squeeze the return of the project.
In the 1970s, this symbolic function of MXD was strongly emphasized. The scale of
MXD was expanded and fresh architectural designs were increasingly valued. This
tendency was based on the financial success of the early MXD in the 1960s. In the 1970s,
when the real estate market was very strong, private developers and public sectors involved
in real projects were very confident to launch megastructure MXD.
3.3 Conclusion
MXDs have tried to create an environment to attract diverse people and activities by
providing a compact, organized marketplace connected with several significant revenue-
producing functions in one commercial development. Instead of trying to change an entire
downtown gradually, city officials found that MXDs might have an instant impact for
downtown revitalization because of their compactness. Private real estate developers also
found a new opportunity to develop MXDs.
Providing economic diversity to a downtown is a major mission of MXDs. MXDs
offer several functions that downtowns have lost and generate economic diversity as well.
Diversity is one of the most important conditions for a downtown to position itself as the
city's central marketplace. Regaining this advantage is essential to revitalize downtown.
Not only in economic terms, but also in physical terms, MXDs have tried to restore
downtown. To accommodate motor vehicles in downtown, roads were widened, and
pedestrian activities were decreased. Successful MXDs enhanced pedestrian circulation
within the project and between the surrounding area. In addition, MXDs have played a
major role in creating a positive identity for downtowns through their distinctive
architectural designs. Deteriorated downtowns need to have a positive identity that
appeals people in the suburbs. Downtown must become a comfortable place to be.
MXDs are in many respects catalysts to revitalizing downtowns. Only one MXD
cannot change a entire downtown, but MXDs have a potential to attract a critical mass of
people to downtown, and these people may attract more people and economic activities. A
series of these changes take relatively a long time. However, revitalizing deteriorated
downtown should be a fairly time-consuming business, considering the enormity of the task.
CHAPTER 4
HORTON PLAZA, SAN DIEGO
4.1 Introduction
Horton Plaza is a revitalization project located in downtown San Diego, California.
The redevelopment area covers 15 city blocks. The core project of the redevelopment plan is
Horton Plaza shopping center, which opened in August, 1985. It consists of three major
department stores, (The Broadway, Mervyn's and, Nordstrom's); and approximately 140
specialty stores. This retail center covers 891,000 square feet of floor space. Horton Plaza
also contains a 14-screen cinema, and two theaters/auditoriums with a total of 770 seats.
In addition to the shopping center, a 452-room hotel (Doubletree Hotel) and 65 units of
apartments and 13,500 square feet of retail complex have been added to the redevelopment
plan (Figure 4-1).
The city of San Diego and the retail developer, Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., jointly
developed Horton Plaza shopping center. The cost of development was approximately
$157 million. San Diego officials authorized the Centre City Development Corporation
(CCDC) to carry out this redevelopment, and the CCDC worked closely with the Hahn
company. They spent 11 years to complete the complex. San Diego was so desperate to
realize the project that CCDC's role in this project was very aggressive. CCDC spent
approximately $24 million to assemble the land and sold it to the Hahn company for $1
million, the low price being an incentive for Hahn to build Horton Plaza. CCDC also
invested in site improvements and amenity costs. CCDC invested a total of $39 million of
the $157 million total development costs while the Hahn company invested $128 million.
Horton Plaza is a striking success. The shopping center enjoys a 95% occupancy,
and per-square-foot sales, an indicator for
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retailers' profitability, was $421 for fiscal 1994 (December 1995-November 1995).1 This is
almost double the industry standard. According to a biennial shopping center research
report by the Urban Land Institute, average sales per square foot for shopping centers
located in downtown or intown was $234.37.2 Higher per square foot sales induces tenants
to accept higher per square foot rent. While the Hahn company does not disclose precise
information about the rent, the average per square foot rent is estimated well above $30.3
Most tenants commit to 10-year leases and turnover is fairly low.
The success of Horton Plaza has stretched beyond the site and has touched the core
of downtown revitalization. This project has successfully attracted diverse people to the
downtown and made both residents and business people reconsider locating downtown.
Even before its completion, Horton Plaza was playing a role in inducing new investments in
downtown. Many private developers, often with assistance from CCDC, have invested
huge amounts of money in office buildings, retail stores, restaurants, and housing since the
1980s. The commercial developments have tremendously changed downtown San Diego,
and, as a result, are successful in attracting diverse people and activities to the city's center.
In this chapter, I will explore the development process of Horton Plaza, the project
design, and a decade of changes that downtown San Diego has experienced since Horton
Plaza was complete.
1 Hahn Company, Sales Performance of Horton Plaza (LaJolla: Hahn Company, 1996).
2 Urban Land Institute, Dollars and Cents of Downtown/Intown Shopping Centers (Washington
D.C.: ULI, 1995), p. 18.
3 The average per square foot rent was $30 in 1985. Rents have been constantly increasing to date
(Interview with Lisa Yamaguchi, Tourism and Media Manager, The Hahn Company, April 12,
1996).
4.2 Historical Perspective
"Horton Plaza," once a half-block park was named after Alonzo Horton, who
donated the park to the city in 1871. It has been a symbol of both the prosperity and the
decline of downtown San Diego. In the 19th century the plaza was the center of civic life of
San Diego, where political rallies, outdoor concerts and celebrations were held. In the 20th
century Alonzo Horton succeeded in moving much of San Diego's commerce from the old
main street, Fifth Avenue, to Broadway, where he had invested his capital in wharves and
office buildings. With this movement away from the old city center, Horton Plaza became
the center of San Diego's commercial life as well as civic life.
After World War II, when the central business district moved north and the populace
moved to the suburbs, downtown, especially south of downtown, gradually became
devastated with poverty and urban blight. Between 1945 and 1975, no major new
development occurred south of Broadway, once San Diego's main street. After San Diego
became one of the nation's fastest-growing cities in the 1960s and 1970s, there was little
growth in downtown population. The city's growth occurred near freeways and shopping
centers far from the center of San Diego. Between 1950 and 1980s the city's population
more than doubled, from 334,000 to 876,000, while San Diego jumped in rank from the 25th
to the 8th largest city in the country.
As people moved to the suburbs, downtown businesses started serving military
sailors on leave, (San Diego has a large U.S. Navy base) and the downtown began declining.
Horton Plaza, once a civic and economic center of San Diego, became known as a place
where rough characters and drunks slept on benches. Surrounding areas were transformed
into a "red light zone" where prostitutes and pimps controlled the scene.
4.3 Planning an MXD in Downtown
4.3.1 The Birth of the Horton Plaza Project
The revitalization plan of downtown San Diego originated with the Horton Plaza
"improvement" plan. This was a reaction to complaints from citizens of San Diego over the
safety of the one-block park and the surrounding area. It was not just a coincidence that
Horton Plaza, once a civic and economic center of San Diego, became a trigger for
downtown revitalization. Residents of Horton Plaza, once an important public space,
complained about the downtown's miserable plight and appealed for improvements. Faced
with the visible problems of the small historic park and the surrounding area, people became
aware of the problem.
Local businessman's organization, San Diegans, Inc., played an important role in
initiating the Horton Plaza redevelopment plan. City council approved a $90,000 budget to
improve the half-block park in 1969 based on the recommendations of San Diego's Planning
Department and San Diegans, Inc. These two organizations promoted the improvement
plan further by arguing that improving the surrounding area would be essential to improving
Horton Plaza. For the city's Planning Department, a positive commitment from the city's
business community (via San Diegans, Inc.) was good leverage. As a result, the
improvement plan for Horton Plaza was expanded to a 15-block redevelopment zone in
1974.
Following the adoption of the Horton Plaza redevelopment area, Columbia (1976),
Marina (1976), and Gaslamp Quarter (1982) redevelopment areas were adopted. (Figure 4-
2). The city intends to expand the CBD to the Columbia Area, and to build housing in the
Marina Area. Horton Plaza was supposed to be the core of these redevelopment projects.
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4.3.2 National Competition
The City's redevelopment plan was based on a key assumption: retail development,
instead of office, was the appropriate use for the site. The city thought that retail
development might give more extensive beneficial impacts than might office development to
downtown. This assumption was clearly stated by the newly elected mayor, Pete Wilson, in
his first State of the City address delivered in January 1972. After announcing an aggressive
agenda to slow development in the far fringes of the city in exchange for promoting growth
within developed areas, Wilson called for "housing, and for cultural, educational, and
recreational facilities to provide diversity of texture and experience among the office towers.
We must commit to aggressively seeking major retail activity downtown. We must, in short,
do whatever we can to make our downtown livable, rather than a place from which people
flee at day's end to the suburbs."4 These words are illustrate exactly what the city center of
Tokyo faces.
City planners also assumed that they had to attract private developers who had
extensive knowledge and experience in retail business to oversee the Horton Plaza
Redevelopment project. The city held a nationally advertised competition to invite such
developers to the 15-block Horton Plaza redevelopment zone in 1974. Prior to its start, the
city conducted several feasibility studies for the site using real estate and development
consultants.
A few preliminary plans were presented to the city by consultants. The Horton
Plaza project had to be economically viable so that private developers would want to
participate. Therefore, the consultants' plans were somewhat optimistic. Pushed by city
officials, including Mayor Wilson, the consultants recommended retail use for the site,
4 Pamela Hamilton, "The Metamorphosis of Downtown San Diego," Urban Land (April 1994), p. 31.
arguing that a retail center would give downtown San Diego economic diversity and induce
more downtown development in the long run. The following are studies on the Horton
Plaza site conducted by consultants:
Consultants Year Recommended Uses
DRA/CKA 1970 Office, hotel-convention and residential
ROMA 1973 Retail, office
KMA 1973 Retail, office
DRA: Development Research Associates, economic consulting firm
CKA: Charles Knerick Associates, economic consulting firm
ROMA: Rockrise, Odermatt, Mountjoy, and Amis, urban design consultants
KMA: Keyser Marston Associates, land economics consultants
However, for private developers, building a retail center in downtown San Diego in
the 1970s was a difficult task. In the early 1970s, suburban malls were the dominant
shopping destinations for affluent customers. As discussed in Chapter 3, with the
movement to the suburbs, San Diego's downtown retail base began to seriously deteriorate
in the 1970s. Major department store followed people to the suburbs and found their new
niche: suburban malls. Some discount stores kept their businesses in downtown, but most
moved out to the suburbs. San Diego was not an exception to this general flight from U.S.
cities in the 1960s and 1970s. Although Horton Plaza's development competition was
based on the ROMA and KMA consultant studies, these two documents were not a rigid
guide for judging the entries. No one, not even the mayor, was certain, at that time, what to
build in the heart of downtown San Diego, one of the country's most pleasant cities, in terms
of climate and its coastal location.
4.3.3 Hahn's Proposal
In 1974, Earnest W. Hahn, Inc. won the right to negotiate exclusively with the city
over the Horton Plaza development over several competitors. Although the proposal from
Hahn was different from the ROMA plan in many respects, the San Diego city council
selected it unanimously based on the company's extensive experience in retail development
and its excellent reputation in the industry and the city.
The Hahn Company today is the largest regional shopping center owner, developer
and manager on the West Coast and one of the largest in the United States. The company
owns or manages 42 regional centers with more than 34 million square feet of space in one of
the country's best retail markets. Ernest W. Hahn, who died in 1994, was the founder and
the most influential figure in the firm. Needless to say, Hahn played a critical role in this
project.
Even for the experienced Hahn company, the Horton Plaza project was somewhat of
a gamble, at least in the beginning because the location of downtown San Diego is far from
the suburban settings, in which the company was most experienced in developing shopping
centers. Therefore, Hahn retained an option to quit the project if certain problems arose for
the company by the time of the third Development and Disposition Agreement (DDA)
signed in 1982.
The complicated and intense negotiations between Hahn, Inc. and San Diego officials
started with a "Negotiation Agreement" which was signed in the summer of 1974. This
agreement required the Hahn company to sign a development agreement within 90 days.
But, the 90-day allowance was not enough for the Hahn company to reach an agreement
with the city on this challenging project. There were no official agreements on the land price,
scale of the project, and the roles of the city and the Hahn, Inc. Hahn's first detailed
proposal following the Negotiation Agreement, differed from the plans prepared by
consultants in many points:
a. Project Area
Hahn suggested that project boundaries be kept flexible allowing for possible
expansion of the project area to the east of the designated redevelopment site
up to Fifth Avenue.
b. Office space reduction
While the ROMA plan recommended 2 million sq. ft. of office space in the
redevelopment project, Hahn proposed to develop only 250,000 sq. ft. of office
space.
c. Hotel
The development of hotels, as suggested by ROMA, would be dependent on a
convention center.
d. Retail space expansion
Hahn proposed 600,000 to 700,000 sq. ft. of retail space in a "regional
shopping facility" rather than the 200,000 sq. ft. of specialty retail
recommended in the ROMA plan.
e. Historic building preservation
Hahn said it was not his intention to convert the Balboa Theater or the
Spreckels Building and that their preservation would have to remain the
responsibility of the Redevelopment Agency. Hahn also assumed that the
Golden West Hotel would be demolished.
f. Project density
ROMA's recommendation for densities of development were thought too high
by Hahn's projections.
g. Parking ratio
Hahn stated quite emphatically that in order for his proposal to work, the
project needed to be supported by enough parking to provide a ratio of at least
five spaces per 1,000 square feet of retail space.
These issues were exactly what the city and the Hahn company negotiated over time.
In addition to differences cited above, Hahn expressed several "conditions" for a
redevelopment agreement. These conditions include: a housing provision (by the city) on
land to the west and south of the project area; construction of a convention center in
downtown.
Such conditions clearly show how the Hahn company conceived of the project at
that time. The Hahn company recognized that the project was risky at least when the
company won the competition. To make it feasible, the Hahn company chose to concentrate
in the retail market, in which they had strength. That decision seemed to raise two
problems: density and parking. The Hahn company, which had specialized in suburban
shopping malls, knew how disadvantageous the higher density was and how important the
parking ratio was for the retail business. They also seemed to think that the redevelopment
project would not be self-sustainable. The Hahn company recognized the improvement of
the surrounding area would be necessary to launch this project, and the city would be
responsible for that.
4.4 Development Efforts
After settling the competition followed by the Negotiation Agreement, the city and
Hahn began straightening many issues out. There was a basic agreement, at this time,
concerning objectives and contributions for the city and the Hahn company as shown in
table 4-1.
Table 4-1 Objectives and Contributions of Horton Plaza Redevelopment
Objectives Contributions
City of San Diego Downtown revitalization Land assembly
Creating jobs Public improvement
Parking space
Credibility
Hahn Company Cash flow Expertise
Management fee Equity capital
Management Capacity
Willingness to incur risk
Relations with anchor tenants
In this partnership, the general partner was the Hahn company. It was supposed to
take all responsibilities for the operation of the project. The city was supposed to "level the
ground" for the redevelopment. The city also intervened on the project design of Horton
Plaza as a partner. Based on this understanding, the city and the Hahn company
negotiated to elaborate details of these contributions. The following are three major
categories of issues they negotiated.
a. Financial Structure
The city intended to take on the burden to assemble the land, however, which
side should pay for what and how much was not determined. Neither was
Hahn's permanent finance plan.
b. Project design and leasing
While the city and the Hahn Company agreed to make a shopping center in the
Horton Plaza Redevelopment area, details including floor area, major tenants,
parking ratio, and architectural design, were not determined.
c. Surrounding area
In the first revised plan, the Hahn company requested that the improvement of
the surrounding area be a condition for redevelopment.
The final agreement for the project called the Development and Disposition
Agreement (DDA) was signed in 1982 when the ground was broken. It took the Hahn
company 11 years to complete the project from the date of the competition. Major
milestones for the Horton Plaza redevelopment are as follows:
Competition 1974
Negotiation Agreement 1975
First DDA 1977
First Amendment to the DDA 1979
Second Amendment to the DDA 1981
Third Amendment to the DDA 1982
Ground Breaking 1982
Opening 1985
The eight-year negotiation (Competition-Third DDA) contains a number of
important suggestions for revitalization projects. In the following sections, I will explore
how the city of San Diego and the Hahn company negotiated the above issues except for the
improvement of the surrounding area. This issue will be discussed in section 4.5 along with
the major changes that have occurred since Horton Plaza was built.
4.4.1 Centre City Development Corporation
The city established Centre City Development Corporation (CCDC) to accelerate
the negotiations of Horton Plaza redevelopment with the Hahn company in 1975. There
were so many problems to be addressed that the bureaucracy in City Hall could be a fatal
obstacle for the redevelopment. That was why the city authorized CCDC, instead of the
Redevelopment Agency or Community Development Agency, to carry out the negotiations
with the Hahn company under the supervision of the Redevelopment Agency. Seven board
directors were appointed to run CCDC.
San Diegans, Inc. recommended that the city establish CCDC and authorize it as a
negotiator for the Horton Plaza redevelopment. CCDC led the negotiations aggressively as
it was supposed to do, and it also allowed San Diego's industry to influence and to assist
the project. It was somewhat a political issue because there was a conflict of benefits
between CCDC and San Diegans, Inc. Many members of the San Diegan's were owners of
downtown properties. In addition, Pete Wilson, then mayor, owned property in the
redevelopment area.
4.4.2 Financial Structure
The total cost of Horton Plaza redevelopment was approximately $157 million.
Table 4-2 shows the breakdown of the sources and uses of funds for this project. In
financial structure the main role for CCDC was to assemble the site. CCDC spent
approximately $24 million to assemble the site. Total funds financed by CCDC was
approximately $39 million. The city financed the necessary capital by tax allocation bonds
(Tax incremental financing-TIF) and loans from San Diego. The Hahn company financed
approximately $117 million. Construction cost, including parking structure was financed
solely by the Hahn company through permanent financing, the sale of department stores,
and its equity.
Table 4-2 Sources and Uses of Funds for Horton Plaza
Uses of Funds
Site Acquisition 25,209,000
Site Improvement 26,285,000
Amenities 9,451,000
Construction 85,000,000
Soft Costs 11,100,000
Total 157,045,000
Sources of Funds
CCDC TIF 21,379,000
Loan from the City 10,393,000
Temporary revenue from the site 6,513,000
Sale of land (to the Hahn company) 1,000,000
CCDC-Total 39,285,000
Hahn Company Equity 15,000,000
Department Store Owners 40,000,000
Permanent Financing 62,760,000
Hahn Company-Total 117,760,000
Total 157,045,000
Source: "Horton Plaza, San Diego," ULI Project Reference File, Vol. 16, 1986
(1) Land Acquisition and Write-Down
The CCDC spent $24 million to assemble the site and sold it for $1 million to the
Hahn company. The disposition price was determined in the Second Amendment of the
DDA in 1979. The total area of the site of Horton Plaza Shopping Center is 11.5 acres.
Therefore, the disposition price per square foot was only $2. The disposition price entailed
extraordinary complicated negotiation. Table 4-3 shows the chronological agreed
disposition prices and collateral conditions.
Table 4-3 Disposition Price Negotiation
Year Disposition Price Parking Floor Area
($ million)
First Proposal 1975 4.68 0 800,000
First DDA 1977 1.5 600 530,000
First Amendment 1979 4.8 987 650,000
Second Amendment 1981 1.0 3,600 780,000
Third Amendment 1982 1.0 2,350 891,000
Source: Jacques Gordon, Horton Plaza, San Diego: A Case Study of Public-Private Development, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Center for Real Estate Development, 1985.
The disposition price was not based on the market. Rather, the price was
determined as a function of the profitability of the project. Hahn regarded the price as the
residual and wanted to keep it flexible as long as possible. Instead of allowing the city to
participate in the profit from the shopping center, he accepted a plan to link the disposition
price to the floor area. The more floor area Hahn wanted to develop, the more Hahn paid
for the site. The disposition price was also affected by the parking issue. There was a
linkage between the disposition price and Hahn's cost for building parking structures.
In the First DDA, signed in 1977, Hahn agreed to pay $1.5 million for land, and
accepted to build 600 parking space. Hahn also decreased projected retail floor space by
270,000 sq. ft. to 530,000 sq.ft. In the First Amendment to DDA, signed in 1979, Hahn
agreed to develop 7 block, instead of five blocks, to accommodate added anchor stores and
parking space. Projected floor area also increased by 120,000 sq. ft. to 650,000 sq. ft.
These expansions for Hahn's retail center plan allowed him, despite the increase of parking
space costs, to pay $4.8 million for land, which is $3.3 million more than that in the
previous agreement.
This negotiation changed its direction drastically in the Second Amendment to the
DDA. At that time, Hahn agreed to build necessary parking spaces at the Hahn company's
expense because of the financial difficulties it was having with CCDC.
In 1981, CCDC found that they could no longer hold the clauses agreed to in the
First Amendment signed in 1979. They did not have enough money to assemble all pieces
of land, and asked the Hahn company to advance the land disposition compensation.
Although CCDC intended to cover the parking construction costs by the bond that was
backed by the revenue from the lease of parking, rising construction costs and high interest
rates made CCDC unable to meet its obligation to build parking.
Supported by positive factors of Horton Plaza project, Hahn agreed to take
responsibility for building a parking garage of 3,600 spaces with the understanding that 450
spaces would be set aside for the new Wells Fargo building adjacent to the retail center.
Despite the difficulties faced by CCDC, the situation in which Hahn was in was far from
depressing. Getting positive responses from several anchor stores, Hahn was gradually
assured of this project. The expanded planned floor area showed Hahn's mind properly. In
exchange for parking construction obligations, Hahn reduced a disposition price to $1
million although the planned floor area was expanded by 130,000 sq. ft.
Although there were some changes for the number of parking space and the projected
floor area, in the Third Amendment to DDA, the disposition price was not changed. The $1
million disposition price was regraded "out of money," that is the price did not represent
any rational pricing process, but the compromise between CCDC and Hahn.
The bottom line for the CCDC, or the public sector, regarding a disposition price was
that a private developer cannot obtain land for little or nothing from the public sector.
Some people in the city council could not understand why a disposition price would not
cover the total cost for land assembly of the Horton Plaza site. Although a disposition
price was reduced by $3.8 million, CCDC saved some $20 million by getting the Hahn
company to build the parking spaces.
(2) Tax Incremental Financing (TIF)
CCDC raised most of the capital necessary for the Horton Plaza project by tax
allocation bonds. This meant that the city did not count on federal funds because city
officials were concerned about delays to be generated by federal officials in Washington,
D.C. In addition, that the federal aid policy was in a transitional phase in the early 1970s
also may have added uncertainty to the project.
Tax incremental financing (TIF), which allocates the increase of the taxes expected to
be generated by development projects to bonds, fitted the Horton Plaza project well. The
area for the allocation of taxes was the 15-block project area set in 1972 (Figure 4-2) when
the Horton Plaza Redevelopment Plan was designated. The Horton Plaza project area held
excellent prospects for the use of TIF. The key to the successful application of TIF was to
define a tax increment district that had a low taxable value but a good chance of being
reassessed at a much higher value during and after redevelopment. TIF is a powerful
economic incentive for the city to finance the development of underutilized areas. The city
gets tax revenue that it otherwise would not receive, and the developer gets a significant
portion of development cost that makes the development more feasible.
Tax allocation bonds issued by the city for this project were the following:
Face Value Net Proceed
1974 $8,000,000 $7,646,000 Refinanced in 1977
1977 $11,000,000 $9,721,000
1982 $5,000,000 $4,583,000
1985 $15,000,000 $14,721,000 5-year notes
$23,000,000 $21,379,000
(3) Hahn's Permanent Financing
In financing the necessary capital, Hahn decided not to try to syndicate this project,
given the size of the loan and the risk involved. If he could find equity partners willing to
contribute the capital he needed, they would want to be guaranteed a return for the capital
because they generally saw the project as risky. However, Hahn could not promise the
return to potential equity partners simply because he was also not sure about the return
from the project.
Hahn negotiated with the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA) for
the permanent financing. The Hahn company and TIAA had a good business relationship in
the past suburban mall developments. Since CCDC required the Hahn company to get a
commitment from a permanent lender to insure that the project would be built, the Hahn
company had to negotiate terms of the loan well in advance of its exercise. TIAA initially
could not commit to the loan terms in advance because of future uncertainties. However,
TIAA, with the decline of interest rates, offered to lend the Hahn company a $60 million
loan at the then-prevailing rate for forward commitments in 1982.
The Hahn company eventually financed another $25 million later on. Three
department stores-Robinson's, Mervyn's, and Nordstrom's-purchased their anchor spots
in the retail center at $40 million altogether. In addition, Hahn invested $15 million as
equity and in total, the Hahn company financed $140 million to cover the entire
expenditure.
4.4.3 Leasing and Project Design
CCDC was aggressive not only in helping the Hahn company for the site, but in
reviewing and criticizing the project design. Since CCDC was eager to make the project a
catalyst to revitalize downtown, they were concerned about how Horton Plaza planners
would deal with the interactions between the surrounding area. Project design is largely
determined by its major tenants. Therefore, tenants and project design was a packaged
issue between CCDC and the Hahn company.
(1) Stumble
Building a retail center in downtown San Diego was such a difficult idea in the 1970s
that Hahn had much difficulty in getting major department stores as "anchor" tenants. No
major department store such as Bergdorf, Neiman Marcus, and Bullocks, were interested in
locating a new shop in downtown San Diego. These department stores targeted middle- or
upper-middle-income people who tended to live, shop, and even work in the suburbs. The
major question for them was could downtown San Diego become a destination for affluent
people in the suburbs. A sense of unwillingness from these department stores meant
negative evaluations for the redevelopment site as a retail destination.
The only commitment that Hahn could get from major tenants were conditional:
Robinson's and Mervyn's committed to join the project on the condition that funding be
provided for improvements in the surrounding area. The next question was which comes
first: The shopping center or improving the surrounding environment. The Hahn company,
as well as the city, could not start the project without solving this puzzle.
The Hahn company changed their plan for the project design assuming that they
could not obtain expected level of rents in 1975. Architect Frank Hope was hired for the
revision. Although Hope kept the basic idea to make a retail center at the site, he revised
the plan less interesting, and costly. The area of development was decreased to a 7-block
area. They eliminated items such as pedestrian walkways and parks that would
incorporate amenities into the project. Their new proposal was more like s giant box, with
retail shops inside, in the center of downtown San Diego.
The city criticized the revised plan. They felt that the revised plan was less
promising as a catalyst for changes in downtown because the megastructure, which was
covered with large bare walls, was not conducive to creating interactions with the
surrounding area. Why did Hahn change the plan so much? Hahn must have known the
revised plan would cause city officials to react negatively. Hahn outlined his reasons to
revise the plan in a nine-page memo to the city's Director of Engineering and Development.
It reads, in part:
"The retail industry is a very traditional and conservative industry and therefore any
success that we might have in re-establishing retail shopping in downtown San Diego
would depend on our ability to produce a center that has at least some of the
characteristics that are found to be comfortable, familiar, and economically viable in
the suburban centers as well as some indication that there will eventually be a
substantial improvement to adjacent property, not only in the Horton Plaza project
but in land to the south."5
Contrary to the city's desire, he wanted to build an enclosed, comfortable, familiar, and
economically viable place to attract conservative major tenants by separating the site from
the surrounding area.
(2) Recovery
While Hahn had difficulties getting commitments from department stores in the early
stage of this development, the situation gradually improved with the recovery of national
economy. He finally got commitments from four department stores: the Broadway (114,000
sq. ft.), Robinson's (135,000 sq. ft.), Mervyn's (88,000 sq. ft.), and Nordstrom's (145,000 sq.
5 Jacques Gordon, Horton Plaza, San Diego: A Case Study of Public-Private Development
(Cambridge: MIT, Center for Real Estate Development, 1985), p. 32.
ft.).
These tenants must have been encouraged by the city's efforts to improve the
surrounding area and by the improved economy. With the increase of available floor area
for these anchor tenants, Hahn expanded the planned floor area to 891,000 sf. Their
decision to join was obviously influenced by the tremendous efforts made by the CCDC to
improve the surrounding area, which will be discussed in the following sections. Counting
on the city's efforts and Hahn's development ability, these department stores, in a sense,
bought the "future" of downtown San Diego.
(3) Jon Jerde
With the improvement of the situation, Hahn became to be more aggressive in the
physical design of the center, and hired the project architect, Jon Jerde in 1977.
Jerde had worked as a chief designer for Charles Kober Associates, then one of the
country's most successful architects. He was not happy working on boring suburban
shopping centers, and left the firm. After touring Europe and visiting many old American
cities, he felt that the "shopping center could contribute to the urban revitalization."6 When
Jerde was offered Horton Plaza, he was almost retired from architecture. Hahn chose him
based on his experience in which he worked with Jerde for a suburban shopping center
project.
Jerde was allowed to freely redesign the first revised plan by architect Frank Hope
which inspired severe criticism in 1975. Jerde's design, in contrast, shows great flexibility
and creativity. Jerde's first design concept was submitted to the CCDC staff in December
1977. His enclosed mall plan was much different from the previous one. Jerde's plan
6 Barbara Goldstein, "Context Consumerism," Architectural Review September, 1988, p. 82.
contained an ice-skating rink, a hotel, restaurants, pubs, residential units, office space and
space for recreational facilities, including a jogging track on the roof.
Commitments from department stores and Jon Jerde changed the entire project
design. In physical terms, Hahn proposed to expand the floor area to accommodate four
department stores to 891,000 sq. ft. in the third DDA signed in 1982. After long and
complex negotiations between the city and Hahn, Hahn decided to build a total of 2,350
structured parking spaces on the assumption that an additional 450 spaces in the adjacent
Home Savings office building would be available to Horton Plaza users.
4.4.4 Project Description
Without question, tremendous backstage efforts made by the CCDC and the Hahn
company created a stable foundation of the project and turned Horton Plaza into a
successful project. In addition, Horton Plaza's distinguished architectural design is also
attributed to its success. However, the architecture design by Jon Jerde is not a creative
architectural masterpiece, but rather a great stage for shoppers and retailers. Ms. Lisa
Yamaguchi, Tourism and Media Manager of the Hahn company, describes it as follows:
"We are really different from most centers. We combine different elements. There are
bright colors that incorporate an European feel of a market place. You hear the music
in the center and we also have strolling entertainment. We have a great mix of
retailers. Combining all these different elements makes Horton Plaza successful."7
In the following sections, I will discuss how these "elements" contribute this shopping center.
(1) Site Plan
7 Interview with Lisa Yamaguchi, April 12, 1996
As shown in Figure 4-1, Horton Plaza is located in a nine-block area bounded by
Broadway on the north, Fourth Avenue on the east, G Street on the south, and First Avenue
on the west. This nine-block area is the heart of the 15-block Horton Plaza redevelopment
plan and also the heart of downtown San Diego.
Regarding the site plan, the diagonal open-air axis beginning at the main entrance at
Nordstrom's is distinguished. This axis differentiates Horton Plaza from a simple linear
space and give visitors a feeling that this shopping center is a virtual busy city square. Due
to many constraints, the mall does not have much open space, and the Floor Area Ratio
(FAR) is relatively high (2.3). Horton Plaza could have been an enclosed mall isolated from
the surrounding neighborhood. However, by making a pedestrian link between the Horton
Plaza Park and First Avenue, visitors to this shopping center can feel the open atmosphere,
and see the sky. The ROMA plan, prepared in 1973, also suggested this diagonal pedestrian
link.
Jerde tried hard not to make Horton Plaza an isolated market place in his design.
He incorporated several devices that would generate interactions between the surrounding
area and Horton Plaza. Making pathways and connections to the surrounding streets
created a stream of people around Horton Plaza. These connections include a cafe terrace
and a farmers' market on First Avenue (Figure 4-3). Jerde tried not to place many bare walls
that would face the surrounding neighborhood. Even the entrance to the parking garage has
a colorful and uneven facade to make the boundaries between Horton Plaza and the rest of
downtown "natural" (Figure 4-4). As Jerde once said, "Ideally, when we're all done, you
won't know that this didn't exist before."8
(2) Architecture
8 Roger Showley, "Killea to ask For Theater, "San Diego Union July 17, 1983, p. B-1.
Hahn believed that physical design was a key to the success of Horton Plaza, and
gave Jerde an expanded role in the project compared to the design role he gave architects in
his suburban developments. One of Jerde's tasks was to make sure that the anchor tenants'
designs were architecturally consistent to his overall design. Hahn wanted to make this
project different from conventional suburban shopping centers and thus encouraged Jerde to
be aggressive in his design. Hahn said, "This damn place should have as little resemblance
to a typical shopping center as possible. I don't want to see a bench, a tree grate, a handrail
or anything else that has ever been used before. I want it utterly unique."' Jerde rightfully
responded to the order to design an unusual shopping center.
Hahn and Jerde did not forget that their task is to design not a monument, but a
shopping center. To meet consumer preferences, and to define what consumers thought was
appealing, Jerde worked closely with Hahn's marketing staff. As a result, Horton Plaza's
basic plan is similar to conventional shopping centers: it has three department stores with
9 Bernard Frieden and Lynne Sagalyn, p. 191.
Figure 4-3 Parking Entrance on the Fourth Avenue
Figure 4-4 Cafeterrace on First Avenue
approximately 140 smaller shops and restaurants in between, and parking garages are
located around the perimeter of the building.
However, unlike in most other malls, the design of Horton Plaza has an extensive
impact. First, the idea of an open-air mall matches the weather and culture of southern
California. Second, the design of the mall is extremely innovative. The architectural ideas
are not new, but their use in downtown shopping center is innovative. Three key words sum
up the architecture of Horton Plaza: symbolic, complex, and commercial.
a. Symbolic
There are many symbolic architectural elements throughout the
facility. Many of them are simple imitations from European
architecture. The palazzo, located in the middle of the pedestrian
link, came from an Italian renaissance town, Siena (Figure 4-5).
Tiers of shopping and food terraces evoke an Aegean town built
along a cliff (Figure 4-6).
b. Complex
The complexity of Horton Plaza contrasts with the extreme simplicity
of suburban shopping mall designs and offers an unusual visual
experience to visitors (Figure 4-7). Many stairs connect the different
levels of this shopping center so that visitors can have fun exploring an
"unknown world." As Jerde has said, "...They like to curve and
angle, dodge, and weave; people like to loiter, too, so there must be
plenty to catch and hold the eye of the customer."10
c. Commercial
Commercialism is a critical finishing touch to Horton Plaza's
architecture. If Horton Plaza's architecture was simply symbolic and
complex, it could not achieve what it has to date because it is not a
cathedral but a shopping center. It is its commercial touch that has made it a
success. Since Jerde had designed many conventional shopping centers, the
experience of which may have made him bored, so he did not stray too far
from commercialism. In other words, his architecture is friendly to users.
Visitors easily understand architect's intentions. For example, variety of colors
used for Horton Plaza simply entertain visitors. Even though some critics
regard this design uninspired, Horton Plaza has proven to be innovative
10 "San Diego Builds a Village Just to Shop In," New York Times August, 17, 1985, p. 48.
Figure 4-5 Palazzo (Horton Plaza-Left) and Palazzo (Siena, Italy-Right)
Figure 4-6 Terrace (Horton Plaza-Left) and Santorini Island (Greek-Right)
enough to inspire downtown San Diego. In other words, Horton Plaza's
architecture did not stray too far from the people's downtown tastes. In
designing Horton Plaza, Jerde met with local merchants and spent much time in
downtown San Diego to capture the "feel" of the area.
Despite its virtues cited above, some people find flaws with Horton Plaza in respect
to the project design. The major criticism has been Horton Plaza's interaction with the
surrounding area such as "Horton Plaza has a crucial flaw that is shared with almost every
suburban shopping mall: If it is the heart of downtown San Diego, it is a heart cut off from
its body, for it has almost no connection with the surrounding streets. It is in downtown, but
not completely of downtown."11
This is one way of looking at this project. However, this reaction was only six
months after the completion of the project. To respond to this properly, we have to see
what have happened since the shopping center was built in downtown, which will be
discussed in the succeeding sections.
11 "In Downtown San Diego, a Freewheeling Fantasy," New York Times March 19, 1986, p. A12.
Figure 4-7 "Complexity" of Horton Plaza
(3) Tenant Mix and Attraction
Horton Plaza currently has three anchor tenants: Broadway, Mervyn's and
Nordstrom's and approximately 140 specialty shops. Table 4-4 shows the tenant mix of
Horton Plaza and the industry average tenant mixes. Horton Plaza has a larger share of
floor space for the specialty stores and a smaller share of women's apparel stores. Women's
apparel is the most frequent seen tenant's category in suburban shopping malls, but such
stores, though commercially successful, add nothing major to malls in terms of facade design
and content. To create an entertaining atmosphere, Horton Plaza increased the share of
specialty stores. Department stores, as "magnets," used to draw people to malls. Such a
role for them is less important today than in the past.
Table 4-4 Tenant Mix
Horton Plaza Industry Average
Women's Apparel 9% 18%
Men's Apparel 2% 4%
Family Apparel 13% 2%
Specialty Apparel 10% 9%
Footwear 8% 7%
Jewelry 7% 2%
Cards and Gifts 3% 6%
Home Furnishing/entertainment 8% 6%
Health and Beauty 3% 2%
Specialty Stores 17% 4%
Fast Food/Restaurant 17% 12%
Packaged Food 2% N/A
General Merchandise N/A N/A
Other N/A 13%
TOTAL 100% 100%
Source: The Hahn Company, Sales Performance of Horton Plaza and ULI, Dollars and Cents of
Downtown/Intown Shopping Centers: 1995
When Robinson's department store decided to leave the mall, the Hahn company
decided not to replace Robinson's with another department store in 1994. It was replaced
by three nationally known specialty shops, one women's apparel shop, and one
entertainment restaurant: Sam Goody (music entertainment), Warner Brothers Studio Store
(a movie-related specialty shop), Bath & Body Works (a beauty related specialty shop).
Planet Hollywood (entertainment restaurant), and The Limited & Express (women's
specialty apparel). Today's retail competition largely generated by pressure from discount
stores has made Horton Plaza differentiate itself from others by emphasizing its
entertainment atmosphere.
Lisa Yamaguchi, Tourism and Media Manager of the Hahn Company, described the
change in the retail industry and the focus of Horton Plaza as follows:
"Retail has changed a lot. The focus has shifted to adding entertainment value or
value-added for the customer. Ten or twenty years ago, people were drawn to the
center by major department store names. Now we have so much competition from
discount stores. We are trying to meet those challenges. One of those ways is
developing the entertainment aspects by providing promotions, events, incorporating a
different mix of tenants and adding theaters or attractions. These represent a very
different focus from those ten or twenty years ago."12
Horton Plaza was in such a difficult situation at that time that this shopping center
incorporated many distinguished features such as bright colors, complex architecture, and
diverse tenant mix, which were uncommon then, to attract as many people as possible.
Today, such efforts have become one of the industry standards. Many shopping malls are
trying to incorporate entertaining aspects to challenge intense competition. Horton Plaza is
one prototype of the entertainment retail center. This proves that Horton Plaza developers
were on the right track especially in its physical design and tenant mix; today's success is a
consequence of these facts.
12 Interview, April 12, 1996.
4.5 Downtown Revitalization (Figure 4-8)
Downtown San Diego has seen extensive changes over the last 20 years. Following
Horton Plaza, office, retail, restaurant, and housing investments have occurred in
downtown and downtown San Diego has succeeded in attracting diverse people and
activities. CCDC has been leading to generate such positive changes since its foundation in
1975. The following shows how much changes have been generated by CCDC since its
foundation.13 CCDC's commitment to the downtown development through $219 million
direct investment has generated $174 million accumulated tax revenue and still brings $30.6
million annual tax revenue to the city.
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Private/Public Ratio
TAXES
Property
Construction Sales
TOTAL TAXES
ANNUAL TAXES
Property
Sales
Hotel Occupancy Tax
TOTAL ANNUAL TAXES
DEVELOPMENT
Housing Units Developed/Assisted
Hotel Rooms
Retail space (square feet)
Office
JOBS
construction
Permanent
TOTAL TOBS
$219 million
$1.76 billion
8.1:1
$163 million
$11 million
$174 million
$19.1 million
$3.6 million
$7.9 million
$30.6 million
3,464 units
3,696 rooms
1.3 million
4.0 million
14,440
4,880
19,320
13 Centre City Development Corporation, Downtown Today (My 1995).
Figure 4-8 Developments in Downtown San Diego
Office
Retail/Conv
Residential
1 Emerald-Sapery Center
2 American Plaza
3 Symphony Towers
4 San Diego Convention Center
5 Marriott HOtel & Marina
6 Hyatt Regency
7 Horton House
8 Lions Community Manor
9 Marina Park
10 Park Row
11 Pantoja Park
12 Market Street Square
13 600 Front Street Apartments
14 Meridian
15 Ralph's Super Market (to be completed September 1996)
Horton Plaza, downtown San Diego's first redevelopment project, was the start of
major changes in San Diego. Even during the planning period, much private money was
invested in downtown banking on the CCDC's active involvement in the Horton Plaza
project. After the success of Horton Plaza, much capital, many tourists, businesspersons,
and San Diego residents have flocked to downtown for shopping and entertainment. As
Frank Alessi, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, CCDC, said, "Horton Plaza is a
keystone development for downtown San Diego. It has been a fantastic success. Without it,
a lot of other investments would not have happened. Residential developments would have
been hard to bring to downtown."14
In the following sections, I will explore how downtown San Diego has been
revitalized in the last decade.
4.5.1 Office Development
Horton Plaza's ground breaking brought a collective sigh of relief from San Diego
citizens, city officials, the Hahn Company, and downtown property owners and
developers. Since the Horton Plaza complex was completed, several other key
redevelopment projects have gone forward based on expectations of downtown San Diego's
continued success. Many more projects are awaiting the final go-ahead.
Plans for the westward extension of the CBD into the Columbia area had suffered a
major setback in 1981, when voters rejected the convention center planned for the area.15
But within several years, investments by Japanese and other lending institutions triggered a
Class A office building boom, which focused attention on the Columbia area and the
14 Interview, April 12, 1996.
15 The San Diego Convention Center was built later that decade by the San Diego Unified Port
District on port-controlled land along Harbor Drive.
traditional office core. In 1982, 2 million sq.ft. of office space in four buildings was added;
another 2 million sq. ft. was added in five additional buildings built between 1989 and
1991. By 1991, a new generation of office buildings, including the Emerald-Shapery Center
(1991), America Plaza (1991), and Symphony Towers (1989) had reshaped SanDiego's
skyline and more than doubled the amount of office square footage downtown.
4.5.2 Gaslamp Quarter
While other redevelopment projects in San Diego included "redevelopment"
investments by the private and public sectors, including new offices, retail stores, hotels,
and public improvements, the revitalization of the Gaslamp Quarter took a different
approach.The area bounded roughly by Fourth Street, Sixth Street, Broadway, and Bay
Street was San Diego's commercial center in the late 18th century. With the decline of
downtown this area became a notorious red light district. Influenced by the Horton Plaza
project, property owners of this district began restoring the area and attracting people to
this city center.
In 1980, the Gaslamp Quarter was declared a National Historic Site, and in 1982,
the city adopted the Gaslamp Quarter Redevelopment Plan. The CCDC began intervening
in the redevelopment actively because the improvement of this district was very important
to Horton Plaza shopping center which, then, CCDC and the Hahn company negotiated.
However, not all of the property owners in the Gaslamp District wanted to restore their
buildings to match the new shopping center. CCDC eagerly persuaded property owners to
respond to the new downtown environment.
In 1985, when Horton Plaza opened and construction of the convention center began,
national restaurant chains began taking notice in downtown San Diego, and the Gaslamp
Quarter. Fancy restaurants, fashionable nightclubs, and retail shops have since replaced
tattoo parlors and pornography shops.
The Gaslamp Quarter is now the recognized entertainment center of San Diego, with
more than 70 restaurants so much so that on weekend evenings, parking spaces are hard to
find. Retailers are beginning to fill in the remaining Victorian storefronts. On weekends, the
Gaslamp Quarter is filled with many local young couples and tourists from around the
world.
4.5.3 The Convention Center
The San Diego Convention Center, opened in 1989, eight years after Mr. Hahn
proposed that the city build a convention center to support Horton Center when he
participated in the competition. The floor area for this convention center is 760,000 sq. ft.,
and the project cost is $140 million. In the center's first year of operations, more than
250,000 out-of-town delegates attended 49 trade shows and conventions, spending $226
million. In its first three years, the center generated $1.1 billion for the local economy,
according to a study by San Diego-based CIC Research.16
The benefits were particularly notable near the new convention center, which
provided a stream of guests for the neighboring San Diego Marriott Hotel & Marina and the
Hyatt Regency San Diego. The center also helped revive the once-seedy Gaslamp Quarter.
The CIC Research study found that 38 restaurants opened in the 16-block Quarter three
years after the center opened. A CIC survey showed that 17 percent of pedestrians in the
Gaslamp Quarter were visitors from the convention center. The study also identified the
Horton Plaza shopping complex, within walking distance of the convention center, as a
destination for 30 percent of delegates.17
16 Pamela Hamiton, p. 38.
17 Ibid
The construction of a convention center, planned in the Columbia redevelopment
area, was rejected by citizens of San Diego in 1981 on the grounds that the proposed
convention center would increase taxes. Now that the center is viewed as an invaluable
asset, the city and sea port have embarked on an expansion plan that could cost up to $164
million. The proposed expansion would double the existing 254,000-square-foot contiguous
exhibit space. According to CIC Research, the annual economic impact of the center could
increase from $580 million in 1991 to $923 million in 1997.
4.5.4 Housing
Making a residential community in downtown has been the greatest challenge for
downtown redevelopment planners. A population increase means the true revitalization of
downtown because many of the unfavorable changes in downtown have been caused by a
flight of the downtown population to the suburbs. The increase of commercial space,
including retail and office space and the convention center, attract mainly day-time
activities. Residents in downtown complete the picture of San Diego's revitalization.
Two apartment towers for senior citizens were pioneering projects developed by
nonprofit housing groups to provide low- and moderate-income seniors with low-cost rental
apartments. Horton House, with 153 units, opened in 1980, and the 131-unit Lions
Community Manor opened in 1981. These projects were followed by Marina Park (1984)
and Park Row (1985), which offered 446 apartments ranging in price from $80,000 to
$200,000. The first units were marketed in 1982.
While these first condominiums were built around Pantoja Park, which gave
residents urban amenities, developers began seeking housing sites around Horton Plaza.
Such residential projects include the 192-unit Market Street Square (1987) which includes 40
units for low-income residents, and the 180-unit 600 Front Street Apartments (1988). The
172-unit Meridian (1985), the first high-rise luxury condominium, was also built near Horton
Plaza.
More than 5,000 residential units have been completed downtown since 1985. New housing
options range from a 230-square-foot furnished unit renting at $366 a month (including
utilities and linens) at the J Street Inn to penthouses atop luxury high rises selling for more
than $2 million. Downtown San Diego has become a place where wealthy people choose to
settle.
The marina area, with the convention center, hotels, and many residential units, has
become an excellent urban residential area. For those familiar with the decrepit state of the
area south of Broadway in the 1970s, these changes are really amazing. The population
increase in this area is well beyond 10,000, and this September, residents here will have a
supermarket just across the street from Horton Plaza. This means that the population in
this area has reached a "critical mass" and these new residents will provide a good customer
base for Horton Plaza.
4.5.5 What is Left?
(1) To whom are redevelopment projects for?
To evaluate more deeply the Horton Plaza redevelopment, we have to ask ourselves
who have benefitted from the success of Horton Plaza or downtown revitalization projects,
and who have not benefitted. A question one might ask is that where did people who used
to live around Horton Plaza Park go? Some of them were given relocation housing in the
process of relocation efforts made by CCDC. However, some people simply moved to other
places in the city. For people who have no choice but living in downtown, Horton Plaza has
not given such significant impact as for people actively involved in San Diego's economic
activities. For them, Horton Plaza, Convention Center, hotel, fancy restaurants in Gaslamp
Quarter are places are "too expensive and for rich people." 18 Horton Plaza teants are also
conscious that their "target customers are relatively up-scaling people." 19
(2) Redevelopment Area Expansion
To respond to such voices, the City of San Diego has expanded the designated
redevelopment areas from the original four (Horton Plaza, Columbia, Marina, and Gaslamp
Quarter) areas to eight areas, which almost covered entire downtown in 1991. The city
intends to spread the success of the Horton Plaza Redevelopment Plan to the entire
downtown. In other words, city wants everyone in this city to benefit from the downtown
revitalization efforts.
CCDC is in charge of all the eight designated redevelopment areas (Figure 4-10). It,
especially, focuses on the east side of downtown, which is called "Expansion Sub Area
Centre City East Redevelopment Districts." In this area, there are many "blight areas" and
poverty and homeless are serious problems. CCDC is trying to induce good housing
investments in this area. To do so CCDC is actively involved in attracting housing
investments by selling land for "cheaper-than-market" prices to prospective developers.
Williams Rawn is the architect for residential development currently being planned
between his firm and the San Diego-based developer of H. Sanders on the site bounded by E
and F Streets and 9th and 10th Avenue. The area where the site is located identified as the
"Art District." Rawn said that the identification of the "Arts District" might give an
impact to the east side of downtown. Horton Plaza has been very successful in revitalizing
18 Interview with Tirel Mayo, Hair Stylist, The Broadway on Fourth, April 12, 1996.
19 Interview with Lisa Yamaguchi, April 12, 1996.
downtown San Diego. From the urban design point of view, the south of Horton Plaza is
wonderful. As a next step, CCDC is trying to improve the eastside by assisting private
residential projects in this area.20
20 Interview with Williams Rawn, Principal, Williams Rawn Associates, April 25, 1996.
4.6 Conclusion
Horton Plaza is one of the few examples of a successful downtown revitalization
project. San Diego and the Hahn company are quite proud of the results. Their efforts paid
off. Thanks to Horton Plaza central downtown San Diego has regained a diverse
population as well as diverse activities. The public's perception of downtown has also
changed. It is no doubt that Horton Plaza is a keystone for these changes.
4.6.1 Reasons for Horton Plaza's Success
(1) City's Commitment
CCDC (the city of San Diego) was actively involved in this project. CCDC acted as
if they were an equity partner in the Horton Plaza redevelopment project. The financial
structure, land assembly and write-down by CCDC were critical factors for the Hahn
company's involvement and ultimate success. Otherwise, they would not have been able to
take on this large project. CCDC also aggressively intervened in the project design and
influenced the Hahn company to build a retail center that would make a strong impact on
the surrounding area and revitalize the entire downtown. This intervention worked to
prevent the Hahn company from designing a conventional, inward-looking mall. Such an
intervention forced Hahn to be more challenging and innovative, and contributed to the
successful project design of Horton Plaza.
Bernard Frieden, in his book "Downtown Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities,"
details how the city's role in urban development project changed drastically after the urban
renewal era. " ...Yet as soon as city officials freed themselves from the straight jacket of
urban renewal, they began to negotiate special deals to suit each project and to spend public
money even before a deal was done. In comparison to the cramped style of the renewal era,
public negotiators were operating more like developers and less like rule-bound
bureaucrats."21
(2) Architectural Design and Tenant Mix
Jerde's architecture is widely attributed to the success of Horton Plaza. The
southern California weather allowed the architect to design this shopping center as an open-
air mall, instead of an enclosed mall. Innovative architectural ideas used in Horton Plaza
create an entertaining atmosphere in the shopping center that compliment the variety of
specialty stores and attractions promoted by the Hahn company.
While planners and the public still criticize the connection between the shopping
center and the surrounding area, Horton Plaza is located at the heart of downtown and is
well connected to the surrounding area as I discussed above. If Horton Plaza was like a
suburban mall and presented monotonous wall to the surrounding area, this project could
not be so successful as it is today.
(3) San Diego's Tourist Attractions
Horton Plazacompliments and feeds off of San Diego's tourist attractions.
Approximately 30% of visitors to Horton Plaza are tourists,22 and Horton Plaza is the third
most popular tourist attraction in San Diego, following only Sea World and San Diego Zoo.
These tourist attractions attract many people form all over the nation and even from foreign
countries.
21 Bernard Frieden and Lynne Sagalyn, p. 134.
22 Interview with Lisa Yamaguchi, April 12, 1996.
(4) Earnest W. Hahn
Earnest W. Hahn played a very important role in this project. His expertise helped
CCDC and himself to overcome many "crises" that came up in their negotiations and to
create an unconventional retail center in downtown San Diego. Even though the Horton
Plaza project was risky for him, he did not give up and kept trying to design an innovative
downtown shopping center. His use of architect was very appropriate and his decision to
create a retail center in downtown San Diego was effective in attracting diverse people and
activities to downtown.
As CCDC's intervention shaped Hahn's strategy for this project, Hahn was an
influential figure for the city in making policies. In other words, Hahn sometimes acted more
like a city official and less like a private developer. CCDC's development efforts in the
surrounding area, including hotels, apartments, and the convention center were suggested by
Hahn. His motivation to do this project was not only the return on investment but also his
desire to revitalize a struggling city. He is a respected person in San Diego even though he is
not originally from San Diego.
(5) General Economy
Horton Plaza was planned when the economy was doing poorly in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Therefore, Hahn had difficulty attracting major department stores to this
project in the early stage of planning. However, with the recovery of the economy, Hahn
successfully attracted major tenants. Horton Plaza opened in 1985. The mid 1980s to the
early 1990s was an extraordinary good period for retail industry especially for regional and
super-regional malls. Horton Plaza fully enjoyed this big retail wave. With a very good
start, Horton Plaza has established a very good reputation, and has survived today's retail
recession.
(6) Lack of Office Space
Horton Plaza does not contain office space. Each preliminary plan prepared by
consultants in the early 1970s recommended that office space be built into Horton Plaza's
redevelopment area. They assumed that office space would bring stable income to the
project. However, Hahn did not accept the recommendation, and proposed to build a retail
center instead. If major office space had been incorporated in the project, Horton Plaza
would have been damaged by the crash of the office market in the early 1990s. This is
opposite to the assumptions made by consultants in the 1970s. Office market has become
more volatile, in cash flow, than is retail.
4.6.2 Horton Plaza as an MXD
One may ask, "Is Horton Plaza a mixed-use development?" Yes, it is, but it is not a
typical MXD in terms of the physical integration of each use. As is discussed in the Chapter
3, a typical MXD physically integrates each of its uses physically and functionally, but, in
the 15-block Horton Plaza redevelopment area, there is little physical integration among
each of uses. In other words, physically, each of the building is more independent, and less
integrated. Horton Plaza has no internal connection with the Doubletree Hotel, The Lyceum
Theater, and 65-unit apartment.
However, with respect to the "synergy" between each use, the Horton Plaza
redevelopment project is an extraordinarily successful mixed-use development case. The
Horton Plaza redevelopment project has crated a real mixed-use area in downtown San
Diego. The process has been incremental. It has taken almost twenty years to take shape.
As discussed in the section 5.5, the success of the Horton Plaza shopping center has
attracted a variety of kinds of investments in downtown, and these investments further
contribute to the current success of Horton Plaza. The Horton Plaza mixed-use
development is not bounded in the adopted 15-block redevelopment area, but stretches out
to the San Diego Convention Center.
4.6.3 Horton Plaza as a "Good Deal"
The city of San Diego and the Hahn company greatly benefited from the Horton
Plaza redevelopment project. Each party achieved its objectives (see Table 4-1). The city
of San Diego has achieved exceptional success in revitalizing downtown San Diego. As
discussed in the section 4.5, since its foundation, CCDC has invested approximately $219
million in Horton Plaza. This investment has drawn $1.76 billion private capital to
downtown, which is 8 times of public capital.
Total accumulated taxes generated by new investment in downtown is $174 million,
which is 79% of the capital invested by the city. The annual tax income, including property
taxes, sales taxes, and hotel occupancy taxes, generated by downtown development
induced by CCDC is $30.6 million, which is 14% of the total capital invested by the city.
For the Hahn company, Horton Plaza is also a really good deal. Horton Plaza is one
of the best properties of its portfolio. The average sales per square foot of Horton Plaza is
one of the three highest figures of the Hahn company's portfolio. In addition to such direct
financial rewards, Hahn company established a very good reputation among retail
developers. Horton Plaza is a spectacular success of Hahn himself and the Hahn company.
CHAPTER 5
RENAISSANCE CENTER, DETROIT
5.1 Introduction
Renaissance Center, or RenCen, as people in Detroit call it, is a revitalization mixed-
use development project located in downtown Detroit, Michigan. The whole development
area covers 28 acres, which faces the Detroit River. It consists of 2.2 million square feet of
office, 390,000 square feet of retail space, and a 1,453-room hotel (Westin Detroit). In
addition, RenCen contains a 3,300-seat restaurant, an 800-seat theater, and parking for
1,200 cars.
This privately owned property was developed by a joint venture consisting of 51
corporations which were motivated to revitalize downtown Detroit. Ford Motor company
assumed leadership in promoting this project. Henry Ford II, then chairman of the Ford
Motor company, played a critical role in developing RenCen. Seriously dedicated to the
revitalization of downtown Detroit, he gathered 50 companies as partners, and put together
the largest privately financed development in the history of the United States, selecting John
Portman as project architect.
The $350 million center was dedicated in April 1977. Everything that comprises
RenCen was massive in scale. Four 39-story office towers, surrounding the 73-story world's
tallest hotel, are the tallest buildings in the State of Michigan. A 14-acre, four level podium
served as the base for the office towers and included retail space and a public area. In
1982, two additional 21-story towers were constructed on the east side of the development
site as a joint venture of Ford Land Development Corporation and Rockefeller Center.
The people in Detroit, who had almost given up hope of revitalizing downtown,
expected RenCen to generate positive changes. It became the symbol of the city. The
regional chamber of commerce incorporated it into its logo two years after RenCen was
completed. It represented Detroit as the Eiffel Tower represents Paris or as the Empire
State Building represents New York.1
Despite tremendous efforts extended by Detroit's business community and people's
expectations, RenCen failed to revitalize downtown Detroit. RenCen itself proved
financially unfeasible. Rents and occupancies for office and retail spaces did not meet
expectations, and the 1,453-room hotel seemed to have too many rooms for the
marketplace. In addition to the financial unfeasibility, the physical design of RenCen was
not favorably accepted by users of RenCen, and it failed to generate interactions between
the project and the surrounding area.
In 1983, six years after opening, RenCen failed to clear its debt service and defaulted.
In exchange for its debt, 53% of its ownership was taken over by five permanent lenders,
including four life insurance companies and Ford Credit company. The financial disaster
made RenCen the vulgar symbol of Detroit. Ruthless criticism claimed that RenCen was a
costly, self-satisfied development full of deficiencies.
In this chapter, I will explore the development process of RenCen, the project design,
financial disaster, its restructuring, and two decades of changes in downtown Detroit has
experienced. Where did RenCen go wrong, and how did it fail to reach its goal of
revitalizing downtown Detroit?
1 Stephen A. Horn, "Detroit Renaissance Center: Redevelopment Rescues City Symbol," Urban Land
(July 1987), p. 7.
5.2 The Site
The area selected for the development was located immediately to the east of the civic
center, bounded by the Henry and Edsel Ford Auditorium, Jefferson Avenue, Antoine Street,
and the Detroit River (Figure 5-1). This site is seven blocks away from the center of
downtown Detroit. For many years, the area between Jefferson Avenue and the river had
consisted of rundown, dilapidated warehouses, lofts, and dock structures which blocked
the public view of the water. In the belief that the river was one of the city's principal
assets, plans were made to tear down these old buildings and develop a civic center from
which people in Detroit could enjoy the view of their waterfront.
The development of the Civic Center, which was supposed to make a connection
between the river front and the existing downtown, changed this area. In the early 1950s,
the area south of Jefferson Avenue between First and Randolph Streets was cleared, and
the Civic Center construction was begun.
The first building, the Veterans' Memorial, dedicated June, 1950, stands at the foot of
Shelby Street, where Cadillac, the founder of Detroit, landed in 1701. Next came the Henry
and Edsel Ford Auditorium. Constructed at the foot of Woodward Avenue, the building
was opened in 1956 as the new home of the Detroit Symphony Orchestra. The auditorium
was the gift of the Ford Motor company and the Ford and Mercury dealers of America, as a
memorial to the two Fords. The initial phase of the civic center development was completed
in 1960 with the opening of the giant Cobo Hall and Arena. Built at the western end of the
center, they have become one of the nation's leading accommodations for conventions and
exhibits.
Figure 5-1 Downtown Detroit and Renaissance Center
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As the civic center began to take shape, other new buildings began to rise in the downtown
area. These included the City-County Building, the Pontchartrain Hotel, the National Bank
of Detroit Building, and the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge. These were followed by the
headquarters of Detroit Bank & Trust Company, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, the
First Federal Savings and Loan Association, and the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan
Building. These were the first buildings to be erected in downtown Detroit since the
Depression. Along with this new construction, several older but structurally sound offices
and stores were remodeled and refurbished inside and out.
Despite the success of the civic center redevelopment, downtown Detroit did not
benefit from this development. The flight to the suburbs was accelerated and downtown
was deteriorated increasingly. In addition, a number of urban renewal projects, as is
described in the Chapter 2, worsened the situation.
Ten-years after the completion of the civic center, the site was chosen to make an
positive impact on Detroit's Downtown. The selection was based on research done by
FMLDC. It selected tens of possible sites in downtown Detroit, and Ford made the final
decision. He selected this site because the site seemed to be assembled easily due to the
small number of land owners and the low intensity of uses. The intention to expand the
Civic Center development was not recognized.
5.3 The Birth of RenCen
After the 1967 riot, the city's business community initiated action to rebuild Detroit by
organizing new agencies and designing pacification strategies for the black community. New
Detroit Inc. began to grant funds to community projects to quell grassroots militancy and
make the city safe again. Another agency, called Detroit Renaissance, was formed to
promote economic development projects in Detroit. This group included Ford Motor,
General Motors (GM), Chrysler, American Motor, utility companies, banks, and other major
local business. Detroit Renaissance was chaired by Ford and Max Fisher, Ford's friend.
The concept of the spectacular riverfront building project that eventually would be called
Renaissance Center grew from this association.
He assigned a top executive, Wayne Doran, president of his company's Land
Development Corporation, to work on the technical real estate details. Ford himself agreed
to raise the money.
In 1971, Henry Ford II announced that a Ford Motor's subsidiary, the Ford Motor
Land Development Corporation (FMLDC) was negotiating to buy a large parcel of unused
land east of the Ford Auditorium between Jefferson and the Detroit River. The 28.5-acre site
would contain a $500-million complex of office buildings, apartments, commercial and
recreational facilities. Ford expressed his enthusiasm about its goal to revitalize downtown
Detroit. Ford said:
"I as an individual am firmly convinced that Detroit must have revitalization
throughout its entire central city area-more business, more life, more good
architecture, and all of the other features that would make it a more attractive place
which to live, work and seek recreation." 2
Since RenCen was planned as a private real estate development, the process of
planning was not disclosed. Until the plan was announced by Ford in 1971, the selection of
the site and project design were discussed by limited people, including Ford, his crews with
FMLDC, and the project architect, John Portman.
Ford was very enthusiastic about the project and involved himself in it to a great
extent. However, he also knew that the project was extremely risky. Several feasibility
studies conducted by FMLDC showed the $500 million complex was too big for the Detroit
downtown market and would not be economically viable. Ronald J. Gagnon, Vice President
of Ford Motor Land Service Corporation, recalled, "People with the Finance Department
(FMLDC) repeatedly advised Henry that RenCen could not make money. Henry
understood what they said, but he just didn't care." 3
As a result of his involvement in the building of RenCen, Ford received many kudos as
a civic-minded citizen anxious to rescue Detroit from years of blight and racial problems.
Mayor Roman Gribbs, sitting next to Ford in the press conference for the announcement of
the project, said, "Henry Ford is synonymous with Detroit. I think Henry Ford II will
become synonymous with the rebirth of Detroit."4
RenCen was not Ford's brainchild. It grew out of a great concern felt by Dwight
Havens, then president of the local chamber of commerce, that the city's businesses were
demonstrating a sorry lack of spirit towards saving Detroit. He wanted to do something
very big-what exactly he was not sure-to revitalize Detroit's downtown. Dwight thought
2 "Ford Unveils Plan for 28-acre Complex,"Detroit News November, 24, 1971.
3 Interview with Ronald J. Gagnon, Vice President, Development Construction and Support Service,
Ford Motor Land Service Corporation, April 26, 1996.
4 "Ford Riverfront Plan Excites Gribbs, Council,"Detroit News November 24, 1971.
that Henry Ford II was the only person who could spearhead such a major endeavor, and
got him interested in his idea by promoting the formation of the agency of Detroit
Renaissance. 5
5 Victor Lasky, Never Complain, Never Explain: The Story of Henry Ford II (New York: Richard
Mark, 1981), pp. 176-177.
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5.4 Development Efforts
Despite much applause, RenCen was fragile because it was not based on a sound
market. Downtown Detroit's office, retail, and hotel markets were too small to feed the
mega-project. The scale of the project was determined not by the market study but by the
degree of impact that RenCen would have on downtown Detroit. The architectural design
was also supposed to enhance RenCen's symbolism.
5.4.1 The Role of The City of Detroit
The City of Detroit did not contribute much to this project. As described above, this
project was first announced by Ford in October 1971. In the following month, Ford had a
meeting with then Mayor Roman Gribbs and the City Council. The reaction was quite
favorable. Because Detroit had not yet recovered from the 1967 riot and was seriously
suffering from urban decline, it had not expected such private capital to come to downtown
Detroit. The plan for RenCen was a pleasant surprise.
The only things for which Ford needed city's help were land acquisition and road
closing. The city owned a piece of land on the site selected for the development, which was
used by pubic utility company. Ford asked for help in buying this land. In addition, Ford
asked an administrative procedure for the closing of some of thoroughfares that ran through
the site for the construction of the project. The city responded favorably to these requests.
Council President Mel Ravits said, " We await the formal presentation of your requests. I'm
sure the council will deliberate quickly. If we were to call for a vote this minute, the
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response would be overwhelming." 6
The lack of city's commitment to this project meant that it did not have much at stake.
In other words, the city could not any power of supervising this project although RenCen's
principal objective, revitalizing downtown, was highly public.
5.4.2 Project Architect, John Portman
Ford chose Georgia-based architect John Portman to design the RenCen and worked
closely with him throughout the project. The selection of the project architect was done
fairly secretly, as was the overall planning of RenCen. FMLDC staff brought Ford many
pictures of buildings designed by famous architects for his selection. Ford visited several of
them, including the Peachtree Center in Atlanta. He was impressed with the Peachtree
Center, especially with the way Portman had used aerial walkways to link a series of
buildings, including a giant merchandising mart, the Hyatt Regency Hotel and three office
buildings. This visit to Atlanta was a major determinant for Portman's selection.
Another major reason Portman was selected as the project architect was that
"Portman, aside from being an architect, was a very successful developer." 7 In his first
success as a developer in Atlanta, Portman exhibited enough entrepreneurial spirit to attract
corporate clients. After the Peachtree project, Portman said:
"We had just finished the largest building in Atlanta, the Merchandise Mart, at one of
the major intersections, and I felt that we could not allow just anything to happen up
6 Detroit News November 24, 1971.
7 Interview with Joseph F. Derkowski, Vice President, Planning and Program Development, Ford
Motor Land Service Corporation, April 26, 1996.
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and down the block and across the street. Why not take the first steps towards creat-
ing a larger-scale environment? So we started assembling land. We gained control of
the plots next door to the Mart and parcels in other key locations, with the specific
aim of creating a new environment that followed a master plan, would grow step by
step, and would add to, not obliterate, the life, the vitality, and the interest of the
existing city." 8
While Atlanta's $125 million Peachtree Center is considered the outstanding
downtown revitalization project in the nation, Portman's work also included the
Bonaventure Hotel development in Los Angeles as well as $175 million Embarcadero Center
on San Francisco's waterfront, which was also planned to revitalize the surrounding area.
Portman participated as a equity partner as well as the project architect.
Ford expected Portman to repeat his success in downtown revitalization projects.
However, Portman viewed the RenCen project as a "very tough job" to "give direction" 9 to
future downtown development, while creating a centerpiece for the city. He speculated that
the feasibility studies would have advised him not to build on the designated site, which is
sandwiched between two rivers (the Detroit River and the eleven-lane traffic of Jefferson
Avenue) with the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel at one end. In addition, he knew that since fear
of the city was very pronounced, he would be expected to create something that would
change the attitude of outsiders toward Detroit.
5.4.3 Site Acquisition
The land acquisition for the site was not much of an obstacle for the project because
8 John Portman, "An Architecture for People and Not for Things," Architectural Record (January
1977) p. 133.
9 Aneb Kgositsile, Tower and Dungeon: A Study in American Spatial Politics, Dissertation,
University of Michigan (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1986) p. 53.
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the site's selection was largely based on the availability of land. All the necessary pieces of
land (28.5 acres) were optioned bought by Ford six months after Ford's announcement in
October, 1971. It is surprising that FMLDC assembled 28.5 acres of land in six months.
There were several reasons for this:
* No one lived on the site, so there was not need to relocate families.
e Except for a public lighting company and some warehouses, the site was unused.
e The landowners were cooperative with Ford. The site was of less value to them since
it was isolated from downtown. In addition, they were supportive to Ford's intention
to revitalize downtown by launching RenCen.
One of the few used piece of land on this site was owned by the City of Detroit. The
5.2 acre site, which was used by the Detroit Public Lighting Commission, was sold to
FMLDC for $1.6 million, $7 per square foot. The public utility company moved to a new
facility. This was the city's major contribution to this project.
5.4.4 Ownership Structure
(1) Renaissance Center Partnership
Ford invited 50 corporations to become equity partners in this project. These 51
equity partners, including FMLDC, formed a limited partnership to build RenCen in 1973.
According to the Department of Commerce, this partnership was the largest investment
group ever assembled for a major redevelopment program in the U.S. Ford explained that
he formed a partnership not because RenCen was too big for one company to carry out, but
because there "should be a lot of people with an interest in Detroit involved in it."10
10 "The Challenge and The Reality,"Detroit News The Sunday News Magazine, June 24, 1973, P
16.
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Despite Ford's remarks, Renaissance Center partnership was formed under the strong
influence of Ford or Detroit's automobile industry. Out of 51 investors, 38 companies
gained all or most of their business from the auto industry. Six investors were banks,
financial institutions, or insurance companies that had substantial deposits from or did
significant amounts of business with the auto makers, primarily Ford and GM. The
remaining seven partners had more limited connections with the industry, such as the
Automobile Club of Michigan and Western International Hotel, which operates the Plaza
Hotel at RenCen.
Ford's message to potential investors was that he did not want gifts from them but
was inviting them into a money-making project which could also greatly benefit Detroit.
FMLDC gave summary information, including pro-forma of the project, to them. They were
invited to the meeting with Ford at Ford Motor world headquarters in Dearborn. Ford
enthusiastically promoted his belief in this project, showing a model of RenCen and slides of
Portman's architecture throughout the world. A few were skeptical but most of them
agreed, at least officially, to the market and financial analyses prepared by FMLDC.
In reality, however, many of them were not overjoyed about being forced to invest in
this project. They expressed their complaints informally to a Detroit newspaper reporter.
One investor said, "The logo of Renaissance Center should have been a twisted arm."
Another put it this way: "It was little more than a sophisticated protection racket... I got the
distinctive impression-although nobody ever said it in so many words-that if we didn't
kick in X number of dollars, our contracts with Ford and GM might be revalued and we
might not end up with as much business as we have now. What does that sound to you?""
These remarks show that investors of this project knew RenCen was not a profitable
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11 Victor Lasky, p. 180.
project. In 1972, The Detroit News published an article titled , "2 Developers Attack Ford's
Riverfront Plan" 12 in which two Detroit-based real estate developers pointed out the risks
associated with RenCen. They commented that the projected office space (2.2 million sq. ft.
- Phase I) would ruin Detroit's office market, and RenCen itself would also be severely
damaged by the competition. In the early 1970s, the downtown office market was soft, and
there were many vacant buildings. In addition, there was little expectation for the growth of
office market. Therefore, RenCen and existing office buildings in downtown Detroit would
compete against each other for a limited amount of office demand. They said, "It's going to
be a disaster for downtown, not a help."
Ford and FMLDC made a comment that the two developers' criticism was merely
"sour grapes."' 3 They emphasized their efforts to draw tenants to RenCen's office space
from outside of Detroit in order not to adversely affect Detroit's downtown office market.
This meant that Detroit's office market could not absorb the 2.2 million sq. ft. office space
to be provided by RenCen's four 39-story office towers. As is described above, Ford and
FMLDC knew that RenCen was risky, but they never admitted it.
(2) Ownership and Financial Structure (Figure 5-2)
Detroit Downtown Development Corporation, a FMLDC's subsidiary, became the
general partner, and 50 other investors became limited partners. Equity share of the general
partners was 67%, and 33% was owned by 50 limited partners. Equity capital from these
partners covered 37% of the total cost of this project, which was $130 million. Ford
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12 Detroit News July, 30, 1972
13 ibid.
Motor's total equity, through subsidiaries, was $87 million. Equity capital accounted for
37% of the total investment of RenCen, 25% of which was provided by the general partner,
with 12% provided by limited partners.
Permanent financing was arranged well in advance of the completion of the project
with the verification of the final master plan by Portman in 1973. Four life insurance
companies provided a total of a $200 million mortgage loan to the project. Three of them
held $50 million mortgage loans: Aetna Life & Causality, John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company, and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States. A $30
million share was held by the Traveler's Insurance Company, and Ford Credit Corporation
held the remaining $20 million.14
Like many equity investors, four life insurance companies gained much business from
the automobile industry. Because automobile companies employ thousands of people, life
insurance for employees is a big business for them. For example, John Hancock exclusively
handled life insurance policies for Ford employees. Instead of joining this project as equity
partners, four life insurance companies took part in it as mortgage lenders.
In addition, two factors encouraged those four lenders to provide such a risky amount
of debt. One was Ford himself. The companies lent money to Renaissance Center
Partnership under the guarantee of the world's largest automobile company, Ford Motor.
The other was the relatively moderate level of the LTV ratio.15 They may have thought the
40% equity cushion would save their money. Obviously the former reason influenced their
decision more than the latter one.
14 This $200 million mortgage was later increased to $220 million because of the reduced debt
service by the partnership.
15 Loan to Value Ratio = Loan amount divided by the Value of the property collateralized.
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Figure 5-2 Ownership and Financial Structure of Renaissance Center
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5.4.5 Project Description
RenCen has been one of the most controversial mixed-use developments in the U.S.
Although it was planned to revitalize downtown Detroit, RenCen has been criticized, aside
from the financial performance, as the development that the revitalization project should
not be. These criticisms, overall, pointed out that RenCen was isolated from downtown
Detroit and that it did not try to create interactions with the surrounding area. "An urban
fortress" is one of the more degrading descriptions of RenCen. In the following sections, I
will explore the problem with the physical appearance of RenCen and the strategy for
tenant mix.
(1) Site Plan
RenCen consists of five towers: the 73-story Westin Hotel, and four 39-story office
towers surrounding the hotel (Figure 5-3). These four towers stand on three-level concrete
square bases (Figure 5-4) which connect each of the towers at the lower level, and cut off
RenCen from the rest of the city and from the riverfront.
RenCen does not have any decent pedestrian connections with the surrounding area.
With respect to the north side, two berms, each 30 feet high and half a block long, are a
physical and psychological obstacle for pedestrians (Figure 5-5). Berms were designed to
house the core of the HVAC system in front of the main entrance on Jefferson Avenue.
These two berms have been severely criticized by a number of urban designers, architects,
and journalists, and inspired the name "urban fortress" for RenCen.
The south side faces the Detroit River, but RenCen does not internalize the amenity
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from the river. The Detroit River entrance is on a different level than the river. The entrance
is just for people who are waiting for cars from parking lots, although facing the Detroit
River was meant to be one of the most important advantages of the site. The Detroit River
is only enjoyed as a distnat view by hotel guests and office workers.
The Detroit-Windsor Tunnel separates the west side of RenCen from the Civic Center
of Detroit. Due to this separation, the main entrance and lobby, on the west side, somehow
lack the distinction desired for a 1453-room hotel.
There are two additional office towers and many parking spaces on the east side.
These two office towers were developed by the joint venture between the FMLDC and
Rockefeller Center as the second phase of the Renaissance Center development. 16 This area
is officially not a part of RenCen. Therefore, despite the involvement of FLMDC, there was
little consideration for the linkage between Phase I and II developments, except for the
facade design. For example, the parking structure for Phase II office towers has ruthlessly
destroyed the integration of this area.
16 Phase II was sold to American Natural Resources in 1984.
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Figure 5-3 Renaissance Center Site Plan
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Figure 5-4 Five Towers and the Concrete Base
Figure 5-5 Berms
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(2) Architecture
RenCen is an obviously inward-looking development. As I discussed above, this was
partly due to the location of the site. The architecture of the project influenced the nature of
RenCen substantially. One of the important characteristics of Portman's architecture is to
create enclosed space that can draw people's daily activities. Paul Goldberger, an
architecture critic, says, "What Portman did, programmatically at least, was to transfer
certain traditional functions of the outdoors-strolling, window shopping, cafe-sitting,
people-watching-to the indoors." 17 Giving up creating interaction between the surrounding
area and RenCen, Ford decided to generate a thriving city in a mega-structure by using
Portman.
Ford wanted the symbolic appearance of RenCen to be a positive identity for
downtown Detroit, and hoped that it would spark a series of positive changes. As is
discussed in the Chapter 3 (see 3.2.2), providing a positive identity to deteriorated
downtown is one of MXD's major goals. This was more emphasized in the 1970s than any
other period of MXD's history, and MXD tended to contain more space. As a result, MXD
became more and more internally focused. John Portman represented the 1970s trend of
MXD.
Unfortunately, the severely criticized architectural design of RenCen is largely
attributed to its failure. Most of RenCen's criticism focused on the following characteristics:
a. Too Symbolic
From a distance, the complex is a sparkling beacon, but up close it is a wall
against the surrounding city. The entire structure is organized around a central
17 Paul Goldberger, "John Portman: Imagined Cities," Global Architecture n.57, 1980, p. 3
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circular atrium, out of which rises the hotel. The office towers are located on
four sides (Figure 5-3), and retail space is distributed throughout several levels
of the central atrium. This design is symbolic enough for an architectural scale
model, but the symmetry of the plan is not easily recognized, since the concrete
base (Figure 5-4), is so vast that it visually dominates the complex. Visitors,
either by automobile or on foot, must enter through the concrete base and easily
lose the sense of the order of the five towers.
b. Too Complex
The interiors of RenCen are so complex that people complain about getting lost
easily. One reason for that is that people become disoriented upon entering
RenCen due to the massive concrete base. The other reason is the complexity
of the interiors. The office towers and all sixteen of the complex's entrances
looked exactly the same. In addition, RenCen is a mixed-use complex, with no
physical separation of its uses. Access to office towers, the hotel, and the
retail areas was confusing. No clear landmarks were available for orientation.
Circulation layouts led people as easily into dead-end walls as to storefronts,
and workers, hotel guests, and visitors were constantly getting lost (Figure 5-6).
c. Product-Oriented Design
Despite the general criticism of Portman's architecture, some critics highly
value RenCen as the product of an ingenious architect. Because Portman is
primarily an architect who creates products rather than a developer whose aim
is to draw people, there is a discrepancy between evaluations as a real estate
development and as an architect's masterpiece. Paul Goldberger is one of the
critics who appreciate RenCen as architecture. While he admits the facade
design is not very recognizable by RenCen's users, he applauds the interiors:
"The interiors here are Portman's most successful, surely. The hotel's
atrium is a variation of the Atlanta space, this time better organized in
terms of levels, and the slight refinements here make a huge
difference-the average visitor can let himself be free to thrill without
having the sense that his bedazed wanderings may get him lost. The
futurism here is mixed in just the right quantity with classic
modernism-the sense is of spaces that are powerful, yet lively;
elaborate and intricate, yet welcoming and surprising." 18
Portman's workstyle and the involvement of Ford characterized the product-
oriented nature of the this project. Since Portman does not like to let a project
get bogged down, he does not brainstorm with his staff. Rather, he begins a
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18 Paul Goldberger, p. 7.
Figure 5-6 Complex Connections
Figure 5-7 RenCen's Interiors
115
project by introducing the "germ of ideas" to a few staff members. Without
interacting with people, he confines himself to his imagination and to develop
ideas for the new project.19 With RenCen, however, Portman worked closely
with Ford, whose principle objective was to create something striking for
downtown Detroit. In particular, he wished to reproduce Atlanta's Peachtree
Center in terms of architectural design as well as the success of the downtown
revitalization. Aside from RenCen, he often intervened in the decision for
building materials and colors for Ford Motor's properties. "He was a self-
appointed architect, and nobody challenged him."20 For RenCen, that was the
case. Ford "flew down to Portman's Atlanta office almost weekly,"21 and
fully supported his designs RenCen. Nobody challenged.
(3) Tenant Mix
For mixed-use development, tenant mix is very important because a successful tenant
mix generates synergy that contributes to a thriving atmosphere of different uses. Among
the many possible uses of MXD, retail space is most important in creating synergy and
thriving atmosphere. Diverse tenant mix in retail space can attract diverse people to the
project. On the other hand, offices and hotels assume a fairly limited group of people
because they cannot offer various ranges of prices. One retail space in MXD can contain
diverse businesses: from up-scale retail stores to fast-food restaurants.
RenCen made a big mistake in retail tenant mix. The marketing strategy of RenCen's
retail space was off the point and full of drawbacks. Original tenant mix was too much
oriented to upscale customers to be drawn from the affluent suburbs. RenCen's 390,000 sq.
ft. retail space2 2 was nearly all leased in 1978, thanks in part to FMLDC, which held local
franchise rights to such renowned names as Givenchy, Cartier, Courages, Lanvin, and
19 Aneb Kgositsile, p. 46.
20 Interview with Ronald J. Gagnon, April 26, 1996.
21 Interview with Joseph. F. Derkowski, April 26, 1996.
22 Before renovation.
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Charles Jordan. Other high-profile retailers included Valentino, F.A.O. Schwarz of Fifth
Avenue, and what was then the first Godiva chocolates boutique outside New York.
However, RenCen's or Ford's dream to create a high fashion district failed. These tenants
failed to attract up-scale customers, and, by 1980, disappeared with the financial woes of
RenCen.
The other problem with the retail area was the lack of anchor tenants. Office workers
in RenCen complained:
"If you have limited time, you can't afford to waste it. There's no assurance that
you'll find that what you want to find in RenCen. There's no major department store
at RenCen: no children's clothing store, or even a place that carries children's gifts. But
if you go to Fairlane (Detroit's suburb), there's Hudson's, Sak's, Lord & Taylor, and
tons of specialty stores."23
RenCen's retail space could draw neither affluent suburbanites, nor the complex's 12,000
tenants and its thousand of hotel guests and visitors, who needed service shops and
moderately priced stores.
23 "Rencen: Renovations Give Retailers a Fresh Start,"Detroit Free Press Feb 7, 1988.
117
5.5 Financial Disaster, Workout, and Renovation
In spite of all this efforts, RenCen was not financially viable and failed to clear its
debt service in 1983. Five mortgage lenders, including the Ford Credit Company, converted
RenCen's debt ($220 million) to equity share to take over the control of RenCen. After the
take-over, lenders made a series of improvements in marketing and the physical design of
RenCen to enhance the center's economic viability.
5.5.1 Financial Disaster
It was not long before RenCen was struck by a severe economic downturn. No sooner
had construction begun than the oil crisis struck, fuel prices tripled, foreign car competition
surged, double-digit inflation bloomed, and Michigan found itself with the nation's highest
unemployment rate, which soared from 6.9% in 1978 to 15.5% in 1982. Detroit's population
dropped from 1.3 million in 1977 to 1.1 million in 1984, a 15% loss in only seven years. The
city's local business activity index dropped from 152 in March 1979 to 98 in June 1980, a
35% tumble in just 15 months.24 While the nation suffered a recession during the early
1980s, Detroit endured a full-blown depression.
These economic problems carried severe consequences for the center's office leasing,
retail sales, and hotel occupancy. Office tenants' space demands were declining or
stagnating, so lease rates could not be set as high as originally anticipated. Retailers
suffered from a general collapse of sales in Detroit, compounded by fewer hotel guests and
negative perceptions of the city's downtown. The convention trade's failure to meet growth
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24 Stephen A. Horn, p. 7.
potential depressed hotel occupancy. Office space, retail shops, and the hotel were caught
in a series of linked circumstances that lowered profits.
(1) Office
The center did succeed in attracting big-name office tenants, including the city's major
financial institutions, all the "Big Eight" accounting firms, and Michigan's largest law firm
and largest public relations firm. Ford demonstrated its commitment by leasing one entire
tower, which came to include the headquarters for its Ford Division, Lincoln-Mercury
Division. General Motors and Honda also expanded into the center. But the major office
tenants were not interested in leasing more space when their companies already foundering.
While Ford used his influence to recruit tenants, he could do nothing to counter the low
rents that resulted from the fundamental weakness of downtown Detroit real estate market.
Because the demand for space was low, rental rates were set at lower-than-anticipated
levels. The average per square foot rent was about $9.625 when RenCen opened. In 1983,
when RenCen partnership defaulted its debt, the average rent was about $13 while at least
$17 was necessary to cover costs associated with four office towers.26 Occupancy
increased, but revenues were less than originally predicted.
(2) Retail
As described above, when RenCen's financial problems were officially reported, many
25 "Renaissance Center: Ford's Costly and Failing Bid to Riverfront," New York Times July 3, 1983.
26 ibid.
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of the center's up-scale retail tenants closed down so that they would not lose their high
fashion images. As a result, occupancy for retail space was approximately 60% with the
average $13 to $15 rent, the nations' lowest retail rent.27
(3) Hotel
Occupancy for the hotel in 1983 was approximately 60%, much lower than the original
expectation. Due to the economic downturn, business people reduced their number of trips
to Detroit, and corporations cut back to semi-annual meetings instead of quarterly
gatherings. Because of competitive pressure, the hotel could not increase its rates.
The hotel had its own difficulties, too. To operate the 1,456-room, 73-story hotel, the
owners selected Westin, a firm known for operating smaller hotels with relatively small
marketing budgets. The center's large hotel was meant to serve corporate and convention
visitors, but the Westin organization was too small to have gained a following among
business executives and convention planners, who develop attachments to certain hotel
chains.
While the hotel seemed to have too many rooms for the market, it suffered because
Detroit had too few hotel rooms overall to attract the big conventions that would have
helped fill the Westin. Before the Westin Hotel, Detroit had only 1,000 hotel rooms while
Atlanta, at one-half of Detroit's city size, had 14,000 rooms in its eight-block downtown
area.
27 "Detroit Big Renaissance Center Project Put Into Detroit on $200 million Mortgage," Wall Street
Journal January 12, 1983
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5.5.2 Financial Workout
In March, 1980, three years after its dedication, RenCen claimed that it was losing
money. RenCen officials asked the city to lower 1980 tax assessment to reduce the center's
property tax, which was more than $6 million a year. The following notes obtained from
newspaper reports over three and a half years, show the RenCen's costly failure:28
1981, October
Center lost $33.5 million in 1980.
Defaulted on its first mortgage of $197 million.
Has lost $103 million since opening in 1977.
Annual report contained warning from auditors that the partnership would not
survive.
1983, January
Owes 2.2 millon in overdue city and county property taxes. Could not say
when the taxes would be paid:
$1.7 million in city & school taxes.
$500,000 to Wayne County.
Richard Routh, spokesman for FMLDC said, "We just don't have the money,
but we have every intention of paying."
Managers unable to make the center's full January mortgage payment and
negotiating with lenders for help.
1983, July
Two additional office buildings completed in 1981-569,000 sq. ft. of space
added to the glut of space for rent.
Rockefeller Center Inc. wants to sell its stake in Phase II Office Towers.
30% of tenants in Phase II office are Ford offices from suburbs.
1983, September
Given reduced interest ratio on mortgage, 7.5% instead of 8.5%.
Refinancing was worked out in February after RenCen defaulted on $220
28 Aneb Kgositsile, pp. 61-61.
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million mortgage and a sale proposal fell through.
What these notes show is funding partners' efforts to save RenCen. Equity partners helped
absorb RenCen's annual losses. Mortgage lenders were generous enough not to foreclose the
property.
In October, 1983, five mortgage lenders concluded foreclosure was not a viable
alternative because of the nature of the property. Instead, they chose to negotiate the
ownership of the center. This resulted in the formation of Renaissance Center Venture, a
partnership composed of the original Renaissance Center Partners and its five mortgage
holders. As a result, RenCen came to be co-owned by the original Renaissance Center
partnership (47%) and five mortgage holders (53%), who became the managing partners,
whose objective was to sell the property after improving RenCen's cash flow.
5.5.3 Renovation
The new managing partners invested $35 million to renovate RenCen. The renovation
began in 1985 and was completed in 1988. The renovation was fairly comprehensive,
including exteriors and interiors of hotel, retail, and office spaces.
(1) Hotel
The hotel's physical separation form the rest of the center's facilities was recognized
as a serious problem. Therefore, the hotel entrance and lobby area were expanded and
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renewed with distinctive design and material. This was supposed to create a welcoming
atmosphere. Before this renovation, the hotel lobby consisted of a long registration counter
which was not recognizable to hotel guests. Since there was no decent hotel entrance and
lobby, these additions did not destroy Portman's work. The new additions, did diminish
Portman's artistic expression to be more friendly to customers.
(2) Retail
The total floor space for retail was reduced from 390,000 to 220,000 sq. ft., a 44%
decrease, and retail was concentrated on the street level. Retail space was removed from
the second level of the base, where upscale retailers had failed to attract customers. This
area was renovated as a professional plaza, where various professional services were
available. Ford opened a large showroom on the second level to take responsible for the
failure of the high-end boutiques.
These expensive boutiques were replaced by stores that would better serve
Renaissance Center's workday clientele. Stores were given large show windows opposite
mirrored pillars with colorful canopies atop each entrance. New signage and decorative
lighting was installed throughout the complex, and carpeting was substituted for the tile
floors that made walks through the center so tiring.
(3) Office
To meet the tenants' satisfaction, quality services were reemphasized. An extensive
cleanup, fix-up, and paint-up campaign was unleashed on the neglected, deteriorated
123
facility. This campaign restored sidewalks, repaired paint, and reupholstered furnishings in
public areas to help employees feel good about their work environment once again. As a
result of the physical improvements and increased tenant satisfaction, office rental rates
rose over a two-year period from about $14 per square foot to $19 per square foot. As of
1987, the office towers are now 97% occupied.29 Due to the real estate recession in the early
1990s, the occupansy decreased. As of 1996, the figure is approximately 85% while asking
rents range from $18 to $23.
(4) Berms
A sky bridge and a train system station changed the facade image of RenCen and
berms. The berm were designed as s base for bridges that would connect the center and
buildings to be built in the surrounding area, but berms could not show this positive
function. Millernder Center, a hotel/apartment complex, made it possible for berms to
show its positive functionality because a see through bridge was built between the center
and the Millender Center, which is connected to the City-County building. In addition, an
elevated people-mover train system station was built on the second berm.
On the other hand, these elevated connections between RenCen and the surrounding
buildings more undermine street level activities. Visitors who access to RenCen through
street level entrance on foot are rarely seen.
29 Stephen A. Horn, p. 10.
30 Telephone Interview with CB Commercial, Detroit Offcie, June 4, 1996.
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5.6 Downtown Detroit
RenCen's contribution to downtown Detroit, aside from making an significant
addition to its skyline, has been marginal. Not many developments have taken place
around RenCen since its completion. Many of them are public developments. Little housing
has been provided. RenCen originally intended to provide middle- to upper-income housing
in the site as Phase III, but it has never been built. The population of Detroit in 1950 was
1,850,000, the city's all-time high; in 1980, 1,300,000, a 30% decrease. In 1990 there was
only 900,000. As shown in Table 5-1, Detroit was consistently lost homes in the 1980s:
Table 5-1 Loss of Homes in Detroit
Year New Homes Built in Home Demolished in Net Loss in Home
Detroit Detroit in Detroit
1980 928 4,387 -3,459
1981 1,372 6,002 -4,630
1982 1,263 3,814 -2,551
1983 165 4,037 -3,872
1984 69 3,656 -3,587
1985 217 4,301 -4,084
1986 223 5,016 -4,793
1987 262 4,796 -4,534
Source: Southwest Michigan Council of Government
In the entire city of Detroit, a city of 140 square miles, during 1987 only two single
family homes were built. There were 260 multiple housing units built. However, more
houses were demolished that year was much more than built. As a result, net decrease came
to 4,534 units.
While RenCen failed to be a catalyst to revitalize downtown Detroit, it has generated
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approximately 3,000 jobs by hotel and retail employment. Because many of the office
tenants in the towers have been drawn from the existing downtown offices, it did not
generate many new job so much. However, at least RenCen has made these workers or
companies, which would otherwise find themselves in suburban office parks. In 1987, there
were 114,000 people working in Detroit's central business district, about 3,000 to 4,000
more than a decade before. Without RenCen, where 14,000 people work, the downtown
workforce would probably be down by 20,000.31
31 "RenCen 10," Detroit Free Press. April 12, 1987.
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5.7 Conclusion
Six years after its doors opened, RenCen fell victim to the same problems it was
expected to solve. As a financial investment, it was a fiasco, so that Ford Motor Company
reluctantly admitted that its huge investment in the project was practically worthless.
While the office space in the four towers is 85% filled, those tenants have been hard to
recruit and pay rents that are too low to cover costs. And despite its magnificence and
good intentions, the Renaissance Center has also failed to spur additional development
downtown.
While RenCen's failure can partly be attributed to the sluggish economy in the late
1970s and the early 1980s, the project design of this MXD itself was more serious problem
than that. In other words, RenCen would not have succeeded even if economy had been
favorable for it.
5.7.1 Reasons for RenCen's Failure
(1) General Economy
RenCen was planned when the economy was doing well in the late 1960s and early
1970s. More importantly, the automobile industry was a leading industry of the U.S. Ford
motor company was big enough to make this risky bid. Rather, Ford and its equity partners
did not seem to be interested in RenCen's economic viability, so the development plan was
not carefully examined. The partners committed to this project and made monetary
contributions as if RenCen had been a charity business.
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In the late 1970s, when RenCen opened, the U.S. experienced a severe recession. In
addition to the Detroit weak market, this recession completely damaged and forced the
project to default. Once RenCen start losing money and went worse than equity partners
thought, they were embarrassed. However, patrons, including Ford Motor were also losing
their power and their "interest" in RenCen when their main businesses started get into
trouble.
(2) Architectural Design
Portman's architecture is widely attributed to the failure of RenCen. While the
location of the site largely defined the nature of RenCen's architecture, his product-oriented
design lacked consideration of a RenCen's objective: to attract diverse people and activities.
Portman only presented downtown Detroit with a costly megastructure. As planners and
the public criticized the lack of connection between the RenCen and the surrounding area,
there was no apparatus with which to generate interactions between RenCen and the
surrounding area.
Concerning people's complaints about the complexity inside of RenCen, Portman
claimed that this complexity was for people to enjoy as they would explore unknown
worlds, as if they were in cities that were new to them. However, most RenCen users were
business people either working in the office towers, or staying at the hotel, and these people
could not afford to enjoy getting lost. They often had little extra time.
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(3) Lack of Development Expertise
In this project there was no one with development expertise. Ford and Portman
played important roles in this project, however, neither of them had development expertise
for this difficult project. The actors consisting of Ford and Portman was never directed by
one expert, so these consumed themselves with creating their monument. They did not try
to solve any marketing problems they might have recognized.
(4) Lack of City's Commitment
The City of Detroit was not actively involved in this project. Detroit acted as if it
was a bystander. If Detroit had joined the RenCen project and intervened in the plan
prepared by Ford and Portman, positive changes would have been made to the project.
Because the city is less product-oriented than Ford or Portman, it may have criticized the
way the two designed RenCen. They could have brought more opinions from ordinary
people's point of view.
(5) Too Much Dependency on Office Space
RenCen depends too much on office space. Planners of RenCen assumed that office
space would bring stable income to the project. However, due to the lack of diversity,
RenCen could not generate positive synergy between the businesses. If well marketed major
retail had been incorporated into the project, RenCen would have been less damaged by the
economic recession.
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5.7.2 RenCen, for Whom?
RenCen's failure was a painful experience for Ford, Detroit's business community,
and the City of Detroit. This was caused partly by accidental changes of economy, but was
also a man-made disaster. Although many people anticipated that RenCen would not be
economically viable even in the planning stage, "good intention" prevented those who
promoted RenCen from paying serious attention to such voices. They may have assumed
that improving RenCen's economic viability was only for equity partners, not for downtown
Detroit. Ignoring the retun on investment was an expression of their motivation for this
project: not for money, but for Detroit.
However, RenCen could have reached its goal, downtown revitalization, only by
showing its economic viability. In other words, If RenCen had been beneficial both for
downtown and investors, it would have revitalize downtown as a marketplace.
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CHAPTER 6
LESSONS FROM U.S. EXPERIENCES
I have explored two mixed-use developments, each of which was planned to
revitalize a deteriorated downtown. In this context, their goals were similar although these
two developments were planned at different times and are located in different cities, San
Diego and Detroit. Local business leaders concerned with the deterioration of their
downtown business districts gave birth to each of the two projects. Yet, in spite of similar
intentions, Horton Plaza and RenCen were developed in quite different ways, and their
outcomes were vastly different. Why did one project succeed and the other fail? A
comparison between Horton Plaza and RenCen can teach us viable lessons about MXD as a
tool for urban revitalization.
6.1 Comparison Between Horton Plaza and the Renaissance Center
In the following sections, I will compare Horton Plaza and Renaissance Center in the
following respects:
e Motivation and Origin
e The Players
e Project Design and Performance
* Outcome
6.1.1 Motivation and Origin
(1) Deteriorated Downtown
Horton Plaza and RenCen were built in order to revitalize downtowns of San Diego
and Detroit, respectively. As described in Chapter 2, San Diego and Detroit were suffering
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from deterioration and suburban flight following World War II. Each project was planned
based on the same logic: that a large-scale commercial real estate development would act as
a catalyst to attract diverse people and activities. Launching MXDs to revitalize downtown
became an established development methodology in the 1970s, and spurred many
successful revitalization developments across the U.S. Horton Plaza and RenCen tried to
imitate these successes.
Despite the overall similarity between San Diego and Detroit's need for revival and
transformation, the two cities, in part, faced different problems. A large and poverty
stricken minority population and the decline of the automobile industry put downtown
Detroit in worse shape than San Diego. In San Diego, people had simply left the city, and
the downtown lost its advantage as the central marketplace. As downtown San Diego
became occupied more and more by the poor, it began to deteriorate in physical terms.
However, while experiencing the deterioration of downtown, San Diego was still a well
regarded resort and tourist destination.
In addition, the Urban Renewal Program created a further difference between the
two cities. The Urban Renewal Program which provided funds to tear down large portions
of Detroit and build buildings and high-rise apartments seriously damaged downtown
Detroit because the city relied too much on this program. A number of traditional
neighborhoods were bulldozed, and freeways were expanded to cut the city into small
separate sections. As a result, many people experienced housing problems. After the 1967
riot, the Detroit Free Press reported that substandard living conditions was one of the major
causes of this riot.1
On the other hand, the Urban Renewal Projects did not cast much of a shadow in
downtown San Diego because the city did not want too many federally subsidized projects.
1 "'Progress Report of the New Detroit Committee," Detroit Free Press, April 12, 1968.
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San Diego Civic Center is one the of few major Urban Renewal Projects in downtown San
Diego, and it did not have a significant impact on downtown.
(2) Business Leaders
When the public sector lost confidence in revitalizing downtown as a result of the
failure of the Urban Renewal Program, local business leaders of these two cities tried to
bring private capital to their downtown.
San Diegans, Inc., a San Diego business leaders' agency, worked hard to create real
estate development projects that could attract private developers. They thought no
development project in downtown San Diego in the early 1970s would be economically
viable without public assistance in various respects, such as public funding and land
assembly by the public sector. Therefore, San Diegans, Inc. was eager for the council's
approval of a $90,000 budget for a market study of Horton Plaza, which endorsed the
concept of the $150 million Horton Plaza redevelopment. Once the city committed to the
project, it became easier to get further help from the city when help was needed.
On the other hand, RenCen was planned purely as a private development, and it
was the largest privately financed real estate development in the U.S. at the time. Because
downtown Detroit was more severely deteriorated than San Diego, it may have been more
difficult for downtown Detroit to attract private capital. However, Henry Ford II remained
committed to this project despite its associated risks. He thought that with good intentions
he could carry out this project and abruptly announced the $500 million complex to the
people of Detroit.
The Hahn company was involved in Horton Plaza development five years after the
$90,000 budget was approved by the city council. Hahn's cautious attitude in the planning
stages of the Horton Plaza project was exactly the opposite of Ford's hasty idealism.
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6.1.2 The Players
(1) Public sector
City officials of San Diego and Detroit played different roles in the development of
their respective revitalization projects. San Diego led the Horton Plaza project from the
beginning. According to San Diegans, Inc. recommendation, the city created the CCDC to
make negotiations with the Hahn company "fluent." In the urban renewal era, city officials
were just federal program application writers and budget allocators, but negotiating with a
private developer required different skills. Detroit was not as involved in RenCen project.
In 1971, when Ford announced the $500 million riverfront development, he "explained" the
plan to the council. The mayor and the council were excited about the plan, and without
full understanding or involvement, they applauded Ford's philanthropic contribution to
downtown Detroit.
While land assembly was San Diego's major contribution to Horton Plaza, Detroit
marginally contributed to RenCen's land acquisition. CCDC purchased all the necessary
pieces of land and arranged for the relocation of families and firms. Most of the capital, a
total of $24 million, was raised through the tax incremental financing (TIF). CCDC wrote-
down the 11.5-acre site, whose acquisition totaled $24 million, to the Hahn company for $1
million, $2 per square foot. Without this contribution, Hahn would not have committed to
this project. Detroit happened to own a piece of land on RenCen's proposed site and sold
5.2-acres of land to FMLDC, upon Ford's request, for $1.6 million, or $7 per square foot.
When the public sector contributes money to a project, it is drawn into the
supervision of the development of the project. CCDC had a strong influence over the design
of Horton Plaza. When Hahn had difficulty getting anchor tenants, he reverted back to an
ordinary suburban shopping mall that did not enhance street level activities. However, the
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design was severely criticized by CCDC and San Diego's Design Review Committee. This
forced Hahn to be more innovative in the architectural design of Horton Plaza. While public
sector involvement and control helped make Horton Plaza a success, public sector's
supervision is not always a constraint for a private developer. As Frieden and Sagalyn say,
the public sector brings an entrepreneurial spirit to the project. Unfortunately, RenCen did
not have a chance to receive constructive supervision from Detroit.
(2) Developer
The developer who led the development team in each project also greatly affected
the projects' results. Ford was the most important person behind RenCen. His motivation
and clout made the project possible. Ford and his companies, Ford Motor and FMLDC,
gathered equity partners, chose the project architect, arranged permanent financing, drew
tenants, and leased offices and retail spaces. Despite Ford's impressive economic and
political clout and good intentions, he had little experience with this kind of project. Ford
and his people simply did not have the expertise needed to develop the $350 million
project.
On the other hand, Hahn's expertise in retail development was indispensable to the
success of San Diego's Horton Plaza development. While he aimed to revitalize downtown
San Diego, he also wanted to secure the economic viability of Horton Plaza. His major
concern was commitment from anchor tenants. Although he had a good relationship with
major department stores, he obviously could not use a strong-arm to get commitments from
them. Instead he shaped the project to make it more appealing to tenants and patrons. His
development expertise in retail development helped him to do this.
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(3) The Architects
The two architects, Jon Jerde and John Portman, were crucial to the development of
the two projects. People rarely talk about Horton Plaza or RenCen without mentioning the
names of Jerde and Portman.
Both architects were chosen by the project leaders, Hahn and Ford. After using a
few architects for Horton Plaza, Hahn offered Jon Jerde the opportunity to design Horton
Plaza. He had collaborated with the Hahn company in the past in developing a few
suburban shopping centers, but he had not exhibited any special talents that made him the
obvious choice for San Diego's downtown retail center. However, architects' names were of
no use for Hahn because he expected Jerde to design an entirely different shopping center
from suburban centers he designed. Still, the selection of Jerde was somewhat of a gamble
for Hahn. Hahn's selection of an architect illustrated the importance of his development
expertise.
Portman had already established his reputation when Ford offered him the RenCen
project. Ford assumed that a famous architect would put a positive spin on RenCen.
Portman's role in designing RenCen was less challenging than Jerde's with Horton Plaza. As
is often said, RenCen is a duplication of the Peachtree Center in Atlanta. In many respects,
it takes after characteristics of the Peachtree Center. Portman was simply supposed to
reproduce the splendid architecture of the Atlanta hotel that had captivated Ford's
imagination.
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6.1.3 Project Design and Performance
(1) Location and Site Plan
The location of the two developments also influenced their degrees of success.
Horton Plaza is located in the heart of downtown San Diego while RenCen is at the edge of
downtown Detroit. These locations have affected the success and failure of each project to
a great degree.
RenCen's site was selected based on the availability of land because Ford did not
want to commit too much money to land assembly and relocation of families and firms. It
would be costly and reminiscent of the Urban Renewal Program, and Ford did not want
people to view his project in a negative light. The site, to which people in Detroit did not
pay much attention, was occupied by a power plant, warehouses, and abandoned
buildings. The only significant history concerning the site is that Lamouthe Cadillac, the
founder of the city, landed near it. When the project was unveiled, no one was skeptical of
the location, but once RenCen was in trouble, people said that RenCen would have been
better off if it had been located at the center of downtown to attract more people and to
create a more positive impact on downtown.
On the other hand, the site for Horton Plaza had been the center for
San Diego's economic and cultural life. Many people congregated in the small park
dedicated by Alonzo Horton in the nineteenth century. The Horton Plaza redevelopment
project grew out of complaints about the safety and order of Horton Plaza park occupied
by strange and rough people. San Diego responded to the complaints by allocating $90,000
for the feasibility study of redevelopment. People's attention on this site and their desire to
improve it contributed to the creation of this project.
The location of the site defined the projects' relationship with the surrounding areas.
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To focus people's attention on the site, Horton Plaza tries to generate as much interaction as
with the surrounding area as possible, while RenCen segregates itself from the rest of the
city. Horton Plaza has pedestrian access as well as automobile access. Bounded on three
sides by the Detroit river, the Detroit-Windsor tunnel, and its Phase II development, RenCen
is open to the public only at the 11-lane Jefferson Avenue, which is no pedestrian
environment at all.
(2) Architectural Design
Hahn and Ford both wanted to make their projects innovative in physical design.
Both of them were aware that their projects were supposed to provide new identities for the
downtown. However, they did not seem very positive about making interactions between
the site and the surrounding area. Ford's selection of the site clearly shows his indifference
to this matter. Even Hahn, who had specialized principally in enclosed suburban shopping
malls, once fell back on a reproduction of a suburban mall-like shopping center.
The city of San Diego was most interested in opening the project to the surrounding
area. Interactions with the surrounding area were one of the city's most important goals for
this project. Several preliminary plans by consultants all shared this goal. Therefore, when
Hahn stepped back, CCDC and the city severely criticized him and required him to open
the project to the surrounding area to enhance street level activities.
Jerde successfully designed Horton Plaza to attract diverse people and activities.
While Jerde's design aims to generate street level activities, it is very successful in creating an
entertaining atmosphere for the shopping center. His design combines European historic
architecture with the Southern California "bright sky" designs. San Diego's exposure to
Spanish culture makes the designer's intention easy to understand. He also designed a
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labyrinthian wonder world by connecting each part of the facility complex. Jerde utilized all
of these interior characteristics to design the facade of Horton Plaza.
On the other hand, Portman's architecture is not appealing to people and does not
generate activities around and inside RenCen. One reason for this is that RenCen is larger
than the human scale. People cannot recognize such architectural intentions as symbolic
symmetry and futuristic gigantic glass facades. These characteristics can only be viewed
from a distance. Huge interiors are also beyond people's perception, causing them to get
lost and frustrated. The complexity of RenCen confused people more than it entertained
them.
(3) Project Plan
The following table presents project information for the two developments. Horton
Plaza is oriented toward retail use and RenCen toward office use. However, it is not
appropriate to call Horton Plaza a retail-concentrated development. As discussed in
Chapter 4, Horton Plaza is not an individual retail development, but a portion of the
integrated 15-block redevelopment plan. In other words, the Horton Plaza shopping center
can be viewed as one vast MXD with an emphasis on retail use. A few office buildings,
retail shops, the Doubletree Hotel, Gaslamp Quarter restaurants, and housing are integrated
with Horton Plaza. In this context, Horton Plaza is an well balanced MXD.
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Table 6-1 Project Information for Horton Plaza and Renaissance Center
Horton Plaza Renaissance Center
Land Use (sq. ft.)
Office none 2,200,000
Retail 891,000 220,000
Hotel (number of rooms) 452 1,453
Other 2 theaters 1 theater
Project Costs ($ million)
Site Acquisition and Improvement 51 35
Construction 85 315
Other 47
Total 157 350
Financing ($ million)
Equity 15 130
Public Funds 39 NA
Debt 63 220
Other 40 none
Total 157 350
Four towers of 2.2 million sq. ft. office space and a 1,453-room Westin Hotel
dominate RenCen. The retail floor area is only one-tenth the size of office space floor area.2
RenCen's Phase III would have added housing, but it was never built. Like Horton Plaza,
RenCen expected other capital to follow it, but two constraints prevented that. One was
RenCen's financial failure. People think RenCen was a bad sign for new investments in
downtown Detroit. The other was RenCen's location. Three sides of RenCen's site are not
expandable. Only the Jefferson Avenue side is expandable, and the Millender Center was
built. Even if RenCen had been financially successful, not much development could have
occurred in the area.
2 The retail floor was reduced from 390,000 to 220,000 sq. ft. in 1987.
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(4) Performance
The total development cost of RenCen ($350 million) was more than double the cost
of Horton Plaza ($175 million), though RenCen was completed in 1977, eight years before
the completion of Horton Plaza. The Hahn company invested equity capital of only 10% of
the total cost while the Renaissance Center Partnership was required to invest 37% of the
total cost. The remaining costs for Horton Plaza were covered by public funds (25%), debt
(40%), and the sale of property to three department stores (25%). RenCen relied on debt
capital (63%) for the rest of the costs.
Horton Plaza and RenCen show a marked contrast in terms of their economic
viability: Horton Plaza is one of the best portfolios of the Hahn company, while RenCen
defaulted on its mortgage in 1983 and was taken over by five mortgage lenders. Horton
Plaza is the third most popular tourist attraction in San Diego, following only Sea World
and the San Diego Zoo. The average per-square-foot sales of Horton Plaza's retail shops
are over $400, which is almost double the industry standard. More visitors and better sales
enhance Horton Plaza's revenue through high occupancy (above 95%) and rent ($30-$50 per
square foot).
RenCen's financial disaster came from low occupancy (retail and hotel) and low
rents (office). Revenue did not cover debt service and the partnership defaulted on the $220
million mortgage but before it did, it spent millions of dollars. In 1981, RenCen announced it
had lost $103 million since its opening in 1977. Equity partners tried to keep RenCen alive
and provided additional equity capital to make up losses. The total capital used for this
megastructure, including the additional $35 million renovation, may have exceeded $500
million.
In April 1996, Hines, an international real estate developer and management
company based in Dallas, made a bid to purchase RenCen from Renaissance Center Venture
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Partnership. Although negotiated prices were not made public, "industry experts are
skeptical that it will fetch much more than $60 million or $90 million." 3
6.1.4 Outcome
As discussed in Chapter 3, the central goal of a private revitalization MXD is to
revitalize downtown as a marketplace that can attract diverse sellers and buyers. Horton
Plaza has succeeded in reviving downtown San Diego as a marketplace where people
gather, and it has attracted billions of dollars in office, retail, hotel, and housing investments
in downtown. As a result, the physical environment of downtown has dramatically
improved. No visitor to the Gaslamp Quarter restaurants can imagine that this area was
once a famous "red light area."
The "cost," totaling $219 million, to generate these changes for the city was mostly
covered by TIF. Annual tax revenue from new developments which the city has promoted
and helped fund is approximately $30 million, which is 14% of the total funding.
Horton Plaza is a "good deal" for the Hahn company as well as for the city of San
Diego. Although accurate financial information on the Hahn company is not available,
Horton Plaza is probably one of its major money makers. Horton Plaza also may have
boosted Hahn company's reputation as a retail developer.
RenCen, despite its large scale, failed to revive downtown Detroit as a marketplace.
Few public investments followed RenCen, and downtown Detroit is still deteriorating, both
physically and economically.
Almost everybody involved in RenCen, including the Ford Motor company, equity
3 "A Landmark in Detroit May Be Sold," New York Times, April 7, 1996.
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partners, and mortgage lenders, lost money. The City of Detroit did not invest itself much
in to the project and gained increased property tax revenue, but RenCen's failure also
damaged it because much private capital was frightened off by RenCen's failure. Portman's
fame was hurt by his architectural design for RenCen.
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6.2 Lessons Learned
Horton Plaza and RenCen show clear contrasts in the three criteria compared
above: the players, project design and performance, and outcome. RenCen lacks every
major attribute that contributed to Horton Plaza's success: public sector commitment,
successful architectural design and tenant-mix, and development expertise. These three
aspects are important lessons learned from U.S. experiences in revitalizing downtowns by
launching MXDs.
6.2.1 Public-Private Partnership
The first and most important lesson is that revitalization MXDs require public-
private partnership. The private sector contributes by examining and shaping the economic
viability of MXDs as commercial real estate developments. The private sector usually
becomes the general partner of this type of joint venture, and takes all risks and returns
from the project after opening.
The public sector provides funds to help MXDs minimize financial risks. In exchange
for public finding, the public sector supervises the development, and often imposes
challenging conditions to the private sector to achieve public purposes. Marietta BaBa, a
Detroit-based researcher, describes the logic of how commercial real estate can serve public
purposes as follows:4
a. Private capital can realize a return on its investment, i.e. there is a
profit to be made.
4 Marietta L. BaBa, Urban Redevelopment in Detroit: The "Renaissance Center Model of Private
Investment and Problems of Unemployment (Detroit: Ethnic Studies Division, Center for Urban
Studies, Wayne State University, 1978), p. 12.
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b. Investments will begin with new projects that are not tied to the
manufacturing sector, i.e. consisting of service industries, office buildings,
apartment complexes as opposed to manufacturing plants;
c. Investment will concentrate upon a limited geographical area around the
Central Business District.
d. The success of these initial investment projects (i.e. high rate of return in income
over expenditures) will generate "spinoff" effects that improve the quality of
life because return of private capital creates:
* more jobs for the unemployed
* an enlarged tax base for the city with subsequent expansion of
city services
e return of white and middle class persons to the city as resident
BaBa argues that downtown revitalization by MXDs should start with the assumption
that private capital can create positive returns on investment. This is the principal reason
why the private sector needs to be involved in the development. As discussed in Chapter 3,
revitalizing downtown as a marketplace is an important objective of MXDs. This is
achieved only through financially successful developments in downtown.
Since revitalization projects are planned in areas where no decent market exists, they
tend to be risky. Public funds play a role to mitigate such market risks so that private
developers can invest. Such finds are deemed as costs for the public sector to achieve their
objectives through this type of partnerships, which strengthen the public sector's supervisory
position. This is why public funds, or public sector commitments, are needed for
revitalization MXDs.
To make the public-private partnership successful, a development project should offer
a good deal for both parties. If the private sector is reluctant to pursue profit from the
project, like Ford in RenCen, its involvement must be discouraged because making a profit
must be the private sector's principal contribution. Conversely, if the public sector is only
interested in a financial return from the project, public funding is just another source of
financing. Achieving various public purposes, such as creating jobs and increasing taxes, are
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also considered a "return" for the public sector. When the public and the private sector
achieve their own objectives in the project cooperatively, urban revitalization MXDs are a
success. For example, the city of San Diego and the Hahn company tried to make the
project as "profitable" as possible from their different points of view and they contributed
their own expertise to the project. Both of them gained "returns" from the Horton Plaza
project. However, RenCen lacked a private sector that was eager to shape the project to
make it financially successful. As Bernard Frieden and Lynn Sagalyn describe it, "If there is
a simple moral to the Renaissance Center story, it is that a partnership based on private
sector commercialism plus public sector entrepreneurship has better prospects than one
based on private sector commitment to philanthropy."5
6.2.2 Project Design
Lessons in project design include physical design, strategic uses and tenant mix of
MXDs. The retail use seems to play a critical role in revitalization MXDs. Architectural
design for revitalization MXD is more important than for other commercial real estate
developments for two reasons. First, MXDs are intended to provide a new positive identity
for deteriorated downtown districts. By providing distinctive architecture, a new focal
point for downtowns can be created. Revitalization MXDs, as public complexes, function
not only for their direct users, but for all the people in the city. Despite its financial failure,
RenCen is still one of Detroit's few prominent symbols that form its skyline.
The other important objective of MXDs is to enhance street-level activities or
interactions with the surrounding area by creating pedestrian circulation. The physical
design of the project is critical to this objective. Inward-looking, high-density architecture is
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5 Frieden and Sagalyn, p. 222.
not appropriate because it may limit people's activities to its inside. Openness of the
project or seamless connection with the surrounding area can be achieved mainly by the
physical design of the projects.
In terms of MXD use, successful marketing for retail space contributes to the success
of the project. One reason for this that retail space can draw a more diverse group of
people than office or hotel spaces because it can draw variety of tenants that target a
diverse group of customers. Horton Plaza's tenants range from fast food restaurants to a
high-end jewelry shop, and its tenant mix strategy aims to create entertainment atmosphere
to draw diverse group of people (see section 4.4.4). Office workers and hotel guests are
generally a limited group of people. While Horton Plaza is generally oriented to upscale
customers (see section 4.5.5), it attracts a more diverse group of people than RenCen.
Frieden and Sagalyn say that the involvement of a retail developer who knew how to draw
a crowd would have changed the situation of RenCen and Detroit better.6
The retail space also influences the physical characteristics of MXDs because it
promotes flexibility in the architectural design of MXDs. Portman's major failure in RenCen
was that he designed spaces that should have been more functionally leisurely. Because
office workers and hotel guests often operate under time pressure, they cannot appreciate
RenCen's complexity. On the other hand, people can enjoy the complexity of Horton Plaza
because they have enough time to explore the facility. If Jerde had designed Horton Plaza
more "functional" than it is, it may not have achieved as much success.
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6 Frieden and Sagalyn, p. 222.
6.2.3 Development Expertise
To learn the most from the lessons described above, development expertise is
indispensable. Without Earnest Hahn, Horton Plaza would not have achieved today's
success. If someone with strong development expertise had worked with Ford, RenCen may
not have lost such a large amount of money, or it may not have been built at all.
Development expertise, in drawing tenants and customers; planning financial structure; and
imaging physical design of projects, choosing appropriate personnel, negotiating with public
sector; and orchestrating the entire team makes all lessons viable. The development
expertise that Hahn exhibited in Horton Plaza is as follows:
* Depth of knowledge in the retail development
e Entrepreneurial spirit
e Business savvy
e Negotiation skills
The first two components are more important than the others. In planning a
revitalization MXD, real estate developers need to be quite knowledgeable in retail
development. As discussed above, retail space can draw a diverse group of people if the
tenant-mix is right. In addition, unlike office or hotel space, retail space allows much
flexibility in the architectural design of the project.
The entrepreneurship is the most important development expertise because MXDs
require savvy decision makers to cope with crises that arise in planing and developing
stages. Because revitalization MXDs are not mass-produced projects, developers are often
required to be more innovative and make risky decisions guided not by past experiences.
Business savvy and negotiation skills help them figure the degree of the risk associated with
these decision making and minimize it.
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6.3 Conclusion
U.S. experiences with downtown revitalization MXDs offer three invaluable lessons:
the importance of the public sector commitment, an innovative project design, and the
development expertise. These lessons show us that a successful MXD as a revitalization
project requires an exquisite combination of public policy and real estate development
business savvy.
For the public sector, the MXD is a way of implementing public policies. Rationales
for the public sector to fund commercial real estate developments are summarized as
follows:
e In revitalizing a downtown, generating economic diversity is essential. Only
successful commercial developments can serve to, as catalysts, stimulate the
downtown economy.
* Because, downtown revitalization projects tend to be risky for private developer, the
public sector must help fund the project to draw private developers. Otherwise,
they will not risk invest dollars in a deteriorating section of the city.
* By providing funds, the public sector can be in a position to supervise the project to
better achieve public goals, such as improving community, creating job.
Objectives of the private sector in committing to the revitalization projects are not
much different from those for ordinary commercial developments (Table 4-1). Why are
innovative private developers willing to commit to revitalization projects that tend to be
riskier than ordinary development projects? The answer is that innovative developers, like
Ernest Hahn, always seek new opportunities, and try to commit themselves to something
different from what they have done. They carefully examine the balance between the
disadvatanges of the market and the type of assistance they can gain from the public sector.
If they think public assistance are enough to compensate for a weakness of the downtown
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market, they go for it.
Project design, including architectural design, its diverse functions, and tenant-mix,
is also a major issue for MXDs. It is important in generating diverse activities in physical
and economic terms. The "right" architectural design is crucial in stimulating physical
interactions between the project and the surrounding area. To generate plenty of
interactions, the MXD must be open to the surrounding area instead of closed and inward-
looking. In addition, diverse economic activities can be created through a diversity of
tenant-mix, especially for the retail space. If retail shops in an MXD are oriented only to a
specific group of people, it will obviously fail to attract a diverse group of people to
downtown. Hence, a thriving downtown requires a diverse economic activities by diverse
groups of people.
Since every MXD is different, no formal standard of development can be created.
Therefore, development skills are needed to apply these lessons. A proposal competition
held by the public sector is one effective way to insure creative and innovative designs and
should be led by the public sector. If the project is initiated by the private sector, the public
sector has to carefully examine the development plan before it decides to commit. Because
development expertise often belongs not to an organization, but to an individual, the
personality of the leading figure of a project is also important.
Hence, learning from U.S. experiences with MXDs can provide MXDs in central
Tokyo with valuable lessons. While these lesson are valuable, we must take into
consideration social and economic factors pertinent to MXDs in Tokyo. I will discuss this in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: CAN TOKYO LEARN LESSONS FROM U.S. EXPERIENCES?
In this chapter, I will discuss how the three MXD lessons learned from U.S.
experiences can be applied to central Tokyo. Exorbitantly high land prices in central Tokyo
are a major barrier in applying these lessons. What prevents Tokyo from learning lessons
from U.S. experiences? How should we modify these lesson to make them viable for MXDs
in central Tokyo?
7.1 Project Design of MXDs in central Tokyo
In discussing the applicability of lessons learned from U.S. experiences, I should note
that the principal objectives of MXDs planned as revitalization projects in Tokyo and U.S.
cities are different. Many U.S. cities have tried to attract private capital to revitalize
downtowns by assisting catalyst projects such as Horton Plaza. On the other hand,
Tokyo's problem has been caused by extremely high land prices caused by too much
concentration in Tokyo. Therefore, inviting private capital is not an objective of MXDs in
central Tokyo.
In Tokyo, the economic diversity that MXDs provide helps make Tokyo a 24-hour
city. The center of Tokyo is dominated by rows of office buildings which have helped
sweep away traditional neighborhoods and small retailers along with aggressive investments
mostly by private developers. MXDs, by their diverse functions, such as retail, residence,
and cultural facilities, can attract diverse groups of people and activities in central Tokyo.
This prevents the city center of Tokyo from being a big hollow at night and on weekends.
Assuming the objective of MXDs in central Tokyo, two important things must be
considered: uses and scale. With respect to the uses, retail and residential must be
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emphasized because office space is already abundant in central Tokyo. Retail and
residential functions can be important additions for central Tokyo. In terms of the scale, in
order for MXDs in central Tokyo to have enough impact to make Tokyo into a 24-hour city,
such MXDs should be large-scale developments. Because Tokyo has a population of more
than 10 million people, developments with a marginal scale would hardly affect the changes
that are necessary. This is exactly the same requirements for MXDs in U.S. downtowns.
However, to satisfy these two requirements in central Tokyo is not easy. It is
difficult to find development sites large enough in central Tokyo. Unlike U.S. cities, there are
few large vacant lots in central Tokyo. If one tries to assemble fragmented parcels of land,
the land cost would be very high. As a result, developers are forced to build high-density
buildings to cover the high land costs. Commercial zones in central Tokyo are usually
regulated to above 5 or 6 FAR while Horton Plaza's FAR is only 2.3. One major lesson
learned about MXD is that they should be physically open to the surrounding area. It is
difficult for high-density buildings to be open to the surrounding area and to generate
interactions between the project and the surrounding area. Therefore, MXDs in central
Tokyo could, like RenCen, become a "fortress" in the city, which is far from the objective to
make Tokyo a 24-hour city filled with diverse people and activities. In addition, since office
rents are generally higher than those of retail and residential rents, pure private MXDs in
central Tokyo are more likely to be office-oriented MXDs, like RenCen.
7.2 Public-Private Partnerships
As one of the three lessons learned shows, the only way to mitigate the contradictory
strategies of commercial real estate development and public purposes is to make MXDs a
joint venture between the public and private sector. However, public-private partnerships
common in U.S. cities are rare in Japan. They are often not acceptable to the general public
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because there is not a general mind set or precedent for the public sector to assist
commercial real estate developments. In other words, the general public in Japan does not
see any reason why public funds should be invested in private development. Hence, in
order for the public-private partnership to take place in Tokyo, roles for the public sector to
play in MXDs should developed, and impediments to the public-private partnership and
possible modification of public-private partnerships for MXDs in central Tokyo must be
explored. These issues are presented in the following sections.
7.2.1 Public sector assistance for MXDs in central Tokyo
The expected public sector roles for MXDs in central Tokyo are summarized as:
* Land provision by either offering publicly-owned land or by assembling land by
eminent domain
* Public funding, which will give a flexibility of project design
The availability of development sites is major issue for MXDs in central Tokyo and
the pubic sector is supposed to contribute to provide them. The liquidity of land in central
Tokyo is so low that land assembly by the private sector base on the sell-purchase
agreement could take years to complete. One reason for this is the high cultural value
placed on owning land. Since World War II, there has been a myth that, "land prices never
go down." This was proven to be false by the real estate market crash in the early 1990s
(see Figure 2-3). Retaining land is always a right decision to make for land owners. Even if
land owners want to sell land or properties, the Tenancy Act may prevent landlords from
selling land because it excessively favors the tenant. Landlords technically cannot terminate
leases as long as tenants behave rightfully and want to renew their leases.
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The Act was enacted after World War II when many people were without housing
after World War II. The Act protects people who do not have any other place to live.
Japan's general housing conditions have improved much and the Act needs to be adjusted to
reflect the realistic situation. However, the nation-wide tenant association, a political
pressure group, vigorously fights attempts to change the Act. If the public sector exercises
the power of eminent domain with appropriate compensation, this problem will be much
easier to tackle.
Public funding is another important public sector role. As is mentioned above,
without the public funding, MXDs in central Tokyo tend to be high-density and office-
oriented. The role of public finding for MXDs in U.S. cities is to minimize the market risk for
private developers while its role for MXDs in central Tokyo is to encourage a flexibility of
project design, including architectural design and functions. This would allow MXDs to be
designed as lower density buildings which could be open to the public, and to incorporate
retail space and residential units, which make MXDs more effective catalyst to revitalize
central Tokyo.
7.2.2 Impediments to the public sector's assistance
There are two obstacles for public sector involvement in MXDs in central Tokyo.
One is that the public sector is generally reluctant to exercise the power of eminent domain.
The other is lack of understanding of public sector commitment to commercial real estate
developments. Even if the public sector retains the right to supervise the project, public
funding to private commercial real estate development is barely acceptable in central Tokyo.
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(1) Eminent domain
Since the ownership of land is considered to be somewhat "sacred" in Japan, if the
public sector tries to exercise eminent domain, the general public may oppose these moves
fiercely. People generally consider that land ownership is a right that cannot be infringed
upon. The mass media in Japan is always on the people's side and often criticizes the
public sector when it exercises the power of eminent domain. This is one of the major
reasons why many fragmented small lots exist in central Tokyo, while assembled land could
have much more value than fragmented land.
Due to this constraint, it is extremely difficult for the public sector to carry out
public projects such as roads and bridges in central Tokyo. Tokyo must spend vast
amounts of time to construct a few hundred feet road if it faces with opposition from
neighborhood groups. Monetary compensation alone does not work. Some land owners
insist on staying where they are regardless of the amount of compensation offered to them.
Tokyo should persuade such land owners to sell their land by one talk with them after
another. Therefore, the public sector does not have a clear advantage in assembling land in
central Tokyo compared with the private sector.
(2) "Minkatsu" partnership
Since real estate development in central Tokyo has always been a safe and profitable
investment, private capital is willing to invest in central Tokyo without public assistance.
Since this has been the case, the public sector never had enough reason to fund private real
estate developments, and did not intend to do so. As discussed in Chapter 2, instead of
launching MXDs through public-private partnerships, municipalities in central Tokyo tried
to attract people by the housing linkage program which failed to meet these goals.
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In Japan, public-private partnerships have been greatly influenced by "minkatsu," a
unique idea introduced to the public sector in the early 1980s. "Minkatsu" literally means
"the vitality of private corporations" in Japanese. It started with utilizing private sectors'
expertise in developing publicly owned properties.
While the concept of "minkatsu" is similar to public-private partnerships in the U.S.
in the sense that both are frameworks for public-private developments, they are vastly
different. One form of "minkatsu" is a simple sell-purchase agreement while the public
sector sells publicly owned land at market prices to private developers through the public
bidding. Another form is a ground lease contract also at market prices. In any case, the
public-private partnership in Japan is a method to utilize private sectors funds in urban
developments where supervision from the public sector is limited to zoning regulations.
The high land prices in Tokyo made this type of partnership possible. Because real
estate used to be almost always a guaranteed investment vehicle, "minkatsu" was a good
deal for the private sector. The public sector also can benefit from this deal by selling or
leasing public properties without any risks. However, after the real estate market crash in
the early 1990s, this type of partnership became difficult to make because real estate no
longer promised a return on investment. Like in the U.S., the current use of land determines
land prices. In addition, with the slow down of the growth of Japan's economy, real estate
markets have become fairly volatile. Every assumption that had supported "minkatsu"
partnership had disappeared.
Land prices, once the reason for "minkatsu" partnerships, adversely affect the
formation of public-private partnerships for revitalization MXDs in central Tokyo.
Although land prices have come to be based on the current use, absolute prices are still high
in central Tokyo. Higher land prices require more public funding to lessen the initial risks.
However, if the public sector commits to funding projects or writing-down publicly owned
properties, the general public may criticize the public sector for the unreasonably generous
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monetary benefit given to corporations from the public. Since the public's perception of
"minkatsu" partnership has not changed, people question why tax yens should be "given" to
private corporations. They believe that private corporations should always pay full prices
for land.
In the U.S., public-private partnerships have also been criticized in the public for the
same reasons. People ask why should tax dollars be give to private corporations. Some
political economists argue that public-private partnerships:
e Promote corporate-oriented development policies
e Allow corporations to do the overall planning while the city government facilitates
corporate plans using municipal legal powers
e Induce municipal democracy to compromise and business control over public
resource allocation is increased.
Moreover they argue, "... because public-private partnerships reflect the agenda of urban
business elites, they tend to have little impact on the central economic problems of urban
areas: inner-city poverty, neighborhood decay, and the shrinking number of quality
development opportunities available to city residents."1
Despite this criticism, public-private partnerships are an established tool of urban
revitalization in the U.S. The success of San Diego's Horton Plaza shows that this criticism
is not always correct. Following Horton Plaza's success, CCDC expanded its
redevelopment area to the entire downtown. CCDC now focuses its efforts on poverty
stricken areas mainly the Centre City East Redevelopment District (Figure 4-8). CCDC is
working to provide affordable housing and improve the physical environment in this area by
using a noted architect, Willams Rawn (section 4.5.5). Because Horton Plaza has revived
downtown as a marketplace and has attracted diverse people and much private capital to
1 Marc V. Levine, "The Politics of Partnership: Urban Redevelopment since 1945," in George
Squires, ed., Unequal Partnership: The Political Economy of Urban Development in Postwar
America (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), p. 13.
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the urban center, CCDC can expand its redevelopment area to more difficult areas.
7.2.3 Modification of the Public-Private Partnership in Central Tokyo
To solve constraints described above completely requires formidable challenge by the
public and private sector. The public sector must have more flexibility in exercising the
power of eminent domain and in investing public fund. People of Tokyo need to
understand the problem with the city center of Tokyo seriously. If the problem becomes an
important political agenda, the public sector will have more flexibility in contributing to
MXDs in central Tokyo. However, it takes a vast amount of time. Therefore, realistically,
we, in the short-run, need to consider modifications in the structure of the public-private
partnership to apply lessons learned from U.S. experiences. These are presented in the
following sections.
(1) Land Provision
Since the public sector is reluctant to use the power of eminent domain and unwilling
to assemble land, public sector contribution in providing development sites is limited.
However there are still two ways to obtain sites for MXDs large enough to make them
significant projects. One is using publicly owned land. The public sector owns many large
surplus development sites in central Tokyo.
Among those, suplus development sites controlled by the Japanese National Railway
Resolution Trust (JNRRT) are significant. JNRRT took over surplus land and a huge debt
from the Japanese National Railway when it was privatized, and plays a role to resolve the
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long-term debt2 by selling surplus sites. It owns over 50 acres of land,3 five times the site of
Horton Plaza and double the site of RenCen.
The other source for large development sites is vacant factory lots. If the public
sector is involved in the development of such sites, it also does not need to assemble land.
With the rapid changes in the industrial structure of Japan and rapid urbanization, there
have been many factories that shut down their operations or moved to the suburbs in Tokyo
beginning in the 1980s. Some of them are still unused and there are some large factories right
outside of central Tokyo that plan to move in the future. I am unable to quantify them, but
the location and the scale of such sites are appropriate for MXDs described above.
(2) "Third-Sector" Partnership
The second modification relates to the structure of public-private partnerships. In
the case of publicly owned land, writing-down land by the public sector is not an
appropriate way because of the potential opposition from the general public as discussed
above. The public sector needs to retain the ownership of the land, and the private sector
should be involved as a developer, not as a consultant or a property manager. If the
privately owned sites are used, public sector funding is necessary.
One of the practical ways to mitigate these requirements is to form a "third-sector,"
which is neither the public (first), nor the private (second) sector. It is a real joint venture
between the public sector and private sector. In this partnership, the public sector pursues
not only public purposes but also enjoys income and capital gains from the project. Unlike
2 Approximately $250 billion ($1=110 yen).
3 Shiodome Cargo Yard (34 acres, Minato ward), Japan Railway Headquarters (3 acres, Chiyoda
ward), Tokyo Station Yaesu Lot (5 acres, Chiyoda ward), and Akihabara Station Lot (8 acres,
Chiyoda ward).
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the city of San Diego, the public sector cannot benefit from the incremental taxes because
there already is much investment in central Tokyo. Therefore, to make MXDs a good deal
for the public sector, the public sector needs to profit from the project. The following table
summarizes the objectives and contributions of this type of public-private partnership.
Table 7-1 Objectives and Contributions of Third-Sector Partnership
Objectives Contributions
Public sector Making a 24-hour city Land provision
Cash flow Funding
Credibility
Private sector Cash flow Land Provision
Management fee Development expertise
Equity capital
Management Capacity
Willingness to incur risk
(3) Constraints on the Modification
These modifications described above are associated with a few constraints which
may seriously impact the project design. First, the modification on the land provision limits
the availability of development sites to a certain degree. If development sites for MXDs in
central Tokyo are limited to utilize public properties, the project may depend too much on
the availability of such land. As a result, it may be forced to locate in an inappropriate
location to generate interactions between the project and the surrounding area. This could
decrease the effectiveness of the project design. For example, if the site is bounded, like
RenCen, by major road, railway, or river, the effectiveness of the project as a catalyst would
be undermined.
In addition, the use of publicly owned land must be controlled by the will of the
public sector that currently retains the ownership of the land. For example, JNRRT's surplus
160
development sites are supposed to be used to repay the vast amount of its long-term debt.
Its primary objective is obviously to liquidate them at market price. Even if JNRRT is
willing to sell the surplus sites to the Tokyo Metropolitan government for MXDs, the
acquisition cost would be too high to afford. The appraised cost of Shiodome Cargo Yard
(34 acres) is approximately 200 times the acquisition cost of Horton Plaza sites for the city
of San Diego.
Second, the "third-sector" partnership may discourage private sector motivation to
commit MXDs in central Tokyo. In the "third-sector" type of partnership, the public and
private sector share the risk and return from the project. This modification is to be made so
that the public sector can join the partnership. For the private sector, compared with the
partnership for Horton Plaza, this type of partnership means less risk and return. Like
Hahn did not want to the public sector to participate in any income and capital gains from
the project, some developer may not be able to find enough reason to commit
"mediocre"development. Even though public contribution is available, MXDs in central
Tokyo is not a easy development. However, the private sector must share the profit from
the project as well as the risk.
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7.3 Can Tokyo be Improved?
I have explored the mixed-use development as a catalyst to revitalize deteriorated
downtown districts in the U.S. and found that MXDs can work to transform the city center
of Tokyo into a thriving place with a diverse group of people and activities, which I call a
"24-hour city." However, lessons from U.S. experiences, including project design, public-
private partnerships, and development expertise, are not directly applicable to MXDs in
central Tokyo due to high land prices. In applying these lessons, some modifications must
be made. Such modification may lessen the effectiveness of MXDs in central Tokyo.
As described above, to learn from these lessons fully and to make MXDs in central
Tokyo successful, more flexible public sector commitment is needed. Since public sector
behaviors are controlled by the general public, people have to change their mind sets to
encourage the public sector to commit aggressively to MXDs in central Tokyo.
The people of Tokyo need to understand two things. First, MXDs in central Tokyo
as revitalization developments can be so effective that they attract diverse people and
generate economic diversity. Hence, public sector commitment in funding and supervising
meets public interests. Municipalities in Tokyo, especially the three central wards must be
more explicit about their problems and their far reaching implications that extend to the
current problems to Tokyo, such as the further flight to the suburbs and physical
deterioration of the city center of Tokyo. Second, real estate development in central Tokyo
can be a very risky business for private corporations, because "minkatsu" partnerships are
no longer viable. To regain economic diversity and attract diverse people and activities in
central Tokyo, the public sector needs to fund MXDs out of its own pocket.
When people become aware of the importance of diversity in the city, and problems
of the city center of Tokyo are taken more seriously than now, MXDs in central Tokyo can
become a more effective tool to make Tokyo a better city.
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